The Falkland Crisis

The Anglo-Argentine Conflict

Beginning of the Crisis

Book one

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
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Contents

Introduction:

Chapter 1: The Falkland islands

- South Orkney islands.
- South Shetland islands .
- South Sandwich island.
- Antarctica

Chapter 2: The history of the Falkland islands

- The Battle of the Falkland of 1914.
- The Dependencies of the Falklands.

Chapter 3:

The disputed islands

Chapter 4 : Introduction to Argentina up to 1982

Beginning of the crisis in 1982.

Bibliography.

Introduction

It is difficult to believe that the island fortress at the center of a major international crisis was once a sleepy island community, in fact, there was no overestimating the transformation that has taken place in the Falkland island since the Argentine invasion on April 2nd 1982.

On Wednesday, March 31st, 1982, the governor of the Falklands Mr. Rex Hunt learned from the foreign office in London that an Argentinian submarine was on its way to spy out likely landing beaches around the capital Stanley. A few hours later, Mr. Hunt summoned the two marine majors in command of the island's meagre garrison to discuss what to do, but nothing indicates better just how Britain miscalculated the looming crisis than the plan that emerged form that meeting; but the fact of the matter was that British governments had for 17 years

tried to find a solution for the islands with Argentina without success, therefore, they were clearly getting impatient with the islanders, and that was clear when the British government decided to withdraw HMS Endurance, also when they commissioned the Shackleton report but then ignored it. Added to this many successive British Ministers had said quite clearly that they were not much concerned about oil, they had enough of their own in the North Sea. The British were also so mean to the islanders, who had not even fulfilled the agreements they had signed with Argentina under which they had promised to provide a shipping link but failed to do so . They claimed that the occasional charter of a Danish tramp steamer would suffice . The British had also signed the fuel oil agreement with the Argentine company YPF by which they agreed to build a deep water jetty for YPF tankers to come alongside, but failed to do so. Even

when the Argentines offered to build the jetty with military engineers and send the British a cut-price bill for the costs, the British had been unwilling to accept. Every British minister the Argentines had seen had said that he wanted to make an agreement, that he accepted that the long-term future of the islands lay with the Argentines, but they had to get around the islanders and when they got around the islanders they were told that they would have to get around a handful of Imperialist antiques in the House of Commons.

The British government did not miscalculate, the situation but the islanders themselves did so, or at least the hard-line islanders who wanted to remain British but from their point of view which meant no changes, no oil rigs, no fishing fleets and freezer plants or hordes of tourists, or new banks; they did not want even a British military garrison, they did

not want to lose their Governor in his colorful uniform with his cooked hat and ostrich feathers.

The successive governments in Argentina have indoctrinated the Argentines with the idea that the Malvinas are theirs as an undisputed right, so after the invasion of April 2nd 1982, the propaganda machine convinced them that the islands were now theirs forever.

In fact, the Argentines were proud of the invasion and delighted that the islands belong to Argentina again after nearly 150 years of British occupation, but there was growing apprehension about the future fearing that as a result Argentina might be involved in a war for the first time in more than a century

However it was believed that the U.S. knew tuat Argentina planned to seize the islands and gave a 'acit go-ahead to ensure the Argentine military junta's co-operation with the U.S. campaigns against guerrillas

in Central America, also to cultivate the friendship of military regimes as the cornerstone of an inter-American front against communism in the western Hemisphere, but the U.S. sources in Washington denied this and said that the U.S. did not know what the Argentines were planning because the invasion scheme was kept secret from all but President Galtieri and the inner circles of the ruling junta, the Foreign Minister Mr. Costa Mendes and a few lower-ranking officers who were needed to plan the mechanics of the April 2nd 1982 invasion; and the junta had no intention of compromising its plans by revealing them to the U.S. or other foreign governments. The junta, however, made several assumptions about how Britain, the U.S.A., and the Soviet Union would react. It assumed that Britain would not resort to military action, that the U.S. would talk the British into accepting some face-saving concessions, and that the

Soviet Union sensing a chance to strengthen its ties with Argentina and would veto any British attempts to obtain redress through the UN Security Council.

In fact, the junta originally acted in the belief that it

could count on the support of Reagan's

administration.

As for world's opinion; the UN security Council voted 10 to one on April 3rd 1982 for the British resolution that demanded the immediate withdrawal of the invading Argentine forces, all the council's third-word members except Panama backed the resolution, but China and Russia abstained as did Spain. However, the pattern began to change when the U.S. recognized the failure of its attempts at mediation and declared itself against Argentina, as a result, The Russians came out much more noisily, verbally belabouring the Americans as well as the British, the Chinese too were sharply criticising both the Americans (because of the

arms sales to Taiwan) and the British, and naturally most Latin American countries. However, after the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgarano most of the third world countries (except English speaking countries) criticised the British and some of them backed Argentina.



 $Pag_{0.50 - \ell}abase r$ Extreme east of Stanley looking west. The cathedral tower is the prominent building: b_0bc_0 -typical rolling landscape of the northern section of East Falkland: Test Index continues:

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Chapter 1

Falkland Islands (Las Islas Malvinas)

A group if Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, lying about 300 miles east of the nearest point to the mainland (Argentina) between 51 and 53 degrees south Latitude, and between 57° 40' and 61° 25' west Longitude. Together, with South Georgia Island, the South Shetlands, South Orkneys, South Sandwich Islands, Graham Land, Coats Land and the sector of Antarctica reaching to the South Pole between Long. 20° west, and 80° west, they form the most southerly colony of the British Empire; but since the creation of the British Antarctica territory in March 1962 the Falkland Islands Dependencies consist only of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Group. The Islands inclusive of rocks and reefs, exceed 190 in number and have a total area of about 4,750 sq. m., but only two are of considerable size (East and West

sq. m., and that of west Falkland 2,020 sq. m., while most of the others are mere islets and the largest of these is 16 mile long by 8 mile wide. The two principal islands are separated by Falkland sound which is a narrow strait from 18 to 2.5 m. in width running north east and south west; and the general appearance of the islands is dreary and monotonous in land with much up-land bog but with fine coastal scenery. The coast-line of both main Islands is deeply indented and many of the bays and inlets form secure and sheltered harbours, some of which are difficult of access to sailing ships.

East Falkland: is (except for a narrow peninsula of 1.5 miles wide) bisected by two deep fjords, Choiseul and Brenton sounds; the northern portion is hilly and is crossed by a rugged and difficult range. There are Wickham Heights which running east and west and

- rising in mount Usborne to 2,245 ft. The remainder of the Island, however, consists chiefly of low undulating ground mostly pasture and morass with many shallow freshwater tarns and small streams running in the valleys. There are also two fine inlets, Berkeley sound, and port William at the north eastern extremity of the Island. Port Louis (formerly the seat of government before second world war) is at the head of Berkeley sound, but the anchorage there having been found rather too exposed. However, about the year
- 1844 a town was laid out and the necessary public building were erected on Stanley harbour, a land-locked harbour within port William.

West Falkland is more hilly near the east island, and the principal mountain range is the Horn by hills which run north and south parallel with Falkland sound. There is also Mount Adam which is the highest hill in the islands about 2,315 ft. high.

Geology:

The Falkland Islands consist entirely (with the exception of the southern part of east Falkland which is Permo-Carboniferous) of the older Paleozoic lower Devonian or upper Silurian, slightly metamorphosed and a good deal crumpled and distorted. In the low grounds clay slate soft sandstone, and on the ridges hardened sandstone passing into the conspicuous white quartzites.

The Falkland Islands are poor in mineral resources, and Galena is found in small quantity, also in some places it contains a large percentage of Silver. Frequently along the coasts there are occurrences of white beach sands, almost exclusively of pure silica which may be of some commercial value in glass manufacture, there are also high-grade iron ores.

Peat is abundant throughout the archipelago and doubtless totals several million tons, and at the

present time this is exploited by the islanders only for their own use.

At port Sussex, at the base of the Black Slates are some fine-grained sands and shales impregnated with carbonaceous matter, but of no economic significance. Carbonaceous and graphitic material is also present at the contacts of the doleritic dykes with sediments in the western part of East Falkland.

Fauna:

Of aboriginal human inhabitants there is no trace in the Falklands, and the land fauna is very scanty. A native small wolf or dog is extinct, the last having been seen about 1875 on the west Falkland, and some herds of cattle and horses ran wild until the first world war, but these were of course introduced. Horses and cattle have declined in numbers, and are being profitably replaced by sheep.

Land-birds are few in kind, and are mostly migrants from South America; they include: the snipe and military starling which on account of its scarlet breast is locally known as the robin. There are also finches and birds of prey such as the turkey Buzzard and Caranche. Down on the beaches as well as in the grass, the Gentoo penguin is to be found; these birds stand about 2 feet high, and with their slatey Grey backs, white breasts and white markings above the eyes are easily distinguishable. On the rocky foreshores live the Rockhopper Penguins (the smallest of Penguins found in the Islands); the Rocky penguins have long feathers on the top of their head and on each side a line of yellow plumes. The Jackass penguin is smaller than the Gentoo and has a narrow white band stretching from the back along the sides of head and neck.

- There is also the Mollymawk or Black-browed Albatross which breed in large numbers on some of the outer Islands and their nests are found frequently beside penguin rookeries; however, these great big birds take a considerable run along the ground like an aeroplane on the runway before they are able to take off. The Logger Ducks have also been found in the Islands, as well as Kelp Geese, Shags, Black-necked Swans and Upland Geese.
- The Dolphin or Scoresby's Gull, the Pied Oyster-Catcher, pink-breasted Gull, wattled Sheathbill, Frent Goose, Night Heron or Quark are all found around the coasts.

Seals live in rookeries in many parts of the Islands and there are three main types as follows: the Sea Lion, Sea Leopard, and the Sea Elephant. The sea lion is of the same type as found all round Latin America, and is strongly polygamous and many a ferocious battle takes place during the breeding season between intruding bulls.

The Sea Leopard is found up to a length of 12 feet and its slim body is of a bluish black colour on top, while the underside is a yellowish white. The sea elephant, which may weight two tons, has an extension at the nose which gives it its name. Finally, a number of fur seals remain and are slowly increasing.

Flora:

The Falkland Islands form essentially a part of Latin America with which they are connected by an elevated submarine plateau, and their flora is much the same as that or Antarctica South America. The trees which form dense forest and scrub in southern America are absent owing to the strong gales and salt-spr and attempts at planting trees have not met at the great success.

In the field of botany, more than 175 species of wild plants have been discovered in the Islands. The prevailing colour of wild flowers in the Islands is white and flowers are to be found tucked away in the loneliest parts. There is also the delicate flower with the pale thin line markings on a white background which is known as the Pale Maiden, and its botanical name is Sisyrinchium Filifolium. There is also the Scurvy Grass and its botanical name Oxalis Ennoophlya which grows and blossoms close to the ground, and the leaves of this plant can be mad into a drink. Down by the sand of the beaches a plant with yellow flowers is common, there are also some flowers to be found growing wild in the Islands such as: Butter Cup, Daisy, Crowfoot, and Vanilla Daisy. There are two vegetable products (the Balsam bog or Azorella Caespitosa, and the Tussock grass or Poa Flabellata) have been objects of curiosity and

interest ever since the first accounts of the Islands were given.

The Balsam bog (Azorella Caespitosa) is a huge mass of a bright green colour living to a great age and when dead becoming of Grey and stony appearance, and when cut open it displays and infinity of tiny leaf buds and stems and at intervals it exudes and aromatic resin.

The Tussock grass (Poa Flabellata) is a wonderful and most valuable natural production which owing to the introduction of stock has become extinct in the two main islands, but still flourishes elsewhere in the group; however it is a reed-like grass which grows in dense tufts from 6 to 10 ft. high from stool-like rootcrowns, and it forms excellent fodder for cattle and is regularly gathered for that purpose.

Moreover, the greater part of the open Islands is formed of Peat which in some places is of great age and depth, and at the bottom of the bed very dense and bituminous. The peat is different in character from that of Northern Europe.

Diddle-Dee (Empetrum Rubrum): this type of heath grows extensively, even on bare rocky ground and in poor soil, and it has a small flower and red berries with rather a bitter taste (the berries are collected by the residents and made into jam).

Malvina Berry (Myrteola Numularia): this is another kind of berry which is eaten and used in cake-making in place of currants, and it is red or pale pink and white on the underside and it is sweet and scented in flavour.

Rubus Geoides or wild strawberry is growing among rocks and in certain parts of the ordinary land. The vine is first observed and in the fruit season the berry is discovered hiding partly in the ground, moreover the berry is a pale red and has more the flavour of raspberry than of strawberry.

Climate:

The Falkland Islands correspond very nearly in Latitude in the southern hemisphere with London in the Northern, although there is little similarity in climate between the two places.

Temperature: the mean annual temperature is 43° F. (5°C), with a maximum average of 64° F. (18°C), and a minimum average of 25° F. (-4° C). The air temperature has never been known to exceed 80° F. (27° C.) or to fall below 12° F. (-11° C), and the average sunshine is about four and a half hours.

Rainfall: the sky is almost constantly overcast, and rain falls mostly in a drizzle and in frequent showers on about 250 days in the year. The annual rainfall rather higher than in the London area, and spread

evenly throughout the year reaching maximum in December and Jan., and minimum in Sep. and Oct.

The rainfall is not great; it averages 26 inches annually, falling from 16 to 21 days a month. Very heavy rain and thunderstorms are uncommon.

Snow: The climate is much colder than in London, and occasional heavy snow falls occur, and the sea in shallow inlets is covered with a thin coating of ice, but in the Falkland Islands itself light falls of snow occur on about 50 days during the year.

Wind: the climate is dominated by the prevailing strong westerly winds, and the main annual wind speed is 16 miles per hour. The wind reaches gale force for at least brief periods (one day in five) and these are spread more or less evenly throughout the year (summer and winter alike). Moreover, storm force winds are almost unknown, although gusts have been recorded above 80 miles per hour.

South Orkney Islands:

The discovery of the south Orkney Islands was a direct result of the rapid rise and decline of the great southern sealing industry which followed in the wake of smith's discovery of the south Shetlands in February 1819.

George Powell who discovered and made the first chart of the South Orkneys was an English sailor who had made at least two voyages into the Antarctic, and he discovered the South Orkneys on December 6th 1821. In 1824, he was in the Pacific Ocean engaged in exploratory work and sperm whaling in a ship called the Rambler, but on April 3rd of that year at Vavau in the Tonga group, while endeavouring to retrieve certain members of his crew who had deserted, he was suddenly set upon by natives and killed. He was only 29 years old.

mountainous and rugged group, lie between the parallels 60° and 61° south, and between the Meridians 44° and 47° west. However, the Islands occur far to the north of the Antarctic Circle. They are a small and somewhat isolated group lying 454 miles south-west of south Georgia and 293 miles north-east of the northern tip of Graham land. Their nearest neighbour is Clarence Island, from which they are separated by 173 miles of open sea. The group on the whole is a compact one, and the major islands which compose it being separated from each other by narrow straits at most a mile or two across.

The Orkney Islands consists of two large Islands:

Coronation Island in the west and Laurie Island in the
east, and two smaller although still considerable

Islands (Powell and Signy) together with a large

number of very small Islands, islets and rocks.

However, Some of the latter, in particular the Inaccessible Islands, lie at a comparatively great distance from the main mass of the group.

The gap between Coronation Island and Laurie Island is 9.5 miles in width, and almost in the middle of it, with its main axis running north and south is the long and narrow Powell Island. Coronation and Laurie Islands are thus separated from each other by two narrow parallel straits (Washington in the east and Lewthwaite in the west).

Signy Island lies half-way along the south coast of Coronation Island and is separated from the latter by a narrow passage (Normanna strait). With the exception of Signy, the Island on the whole rise abruptly from the Sea by irregular ridges and sharp peaks to the crest of a mountain chain or central ridge

• of very variable height which, running from east to west, forms the backbone of the group.

In the spring innumerable Sea birds come to the Islands to nest and breed, and they remain throughout the summer until autumn, scouring the surrounding seas for their food, they are largely petrels of several kinds and penguins; the latter to the number of several millions occupy every available rocky site along the ice-bound coasts.

 Seals of the several Antarctic species are scattered around the coasts in moderate numbers from spring to autumn.

The South Shetland Islands:

A chain of Islands on the border of the Antarctic region, lying about 400 miles south east of Cape Horn,

separated by Bransfield strait from Graham land.

The south Shetlands are composed of a number of Islands extending over a distance of 550 km. from Smith Island in the south-west to Clarence Island in the north-east; and they are built partly of rocks erupted from former volcanoes beneath the sea.

Deception Island is of volcanic origin, but in 1905, Otto Nordenskjold found no exterior evidence of volcanic activity, however, a violent eruption in 1967 and subsequent activity in 1969 and 1970 fully demonstrated that the volcano is far from being exhausted. Most of the Islands are rocky and mountainous, and some peaks are between 6.000 and 7.000 ft. in height.

On February 19th 1819, Captain William Smith of the English brig (Williams) observed the South Shetland coast. Revisiting it in October 1819, he landed on king

George 1st. Island, taking possession for England, he also gave the whole chain the name it bears.

The Islands are permanently frozen, barren but there are several good harbours open during the summer months, including the landlocked harbour of Deception Island, the entrance to which is only about 200 yards wide. The roadstead of this harbour is from 5 to 6 miles wide and has a depth of several fathoms at its deepest part; moreover, the Islands possess only one ice-free beach, due to the presence of hot streams. The Islands are covered with snow for the greater part of the year, and growing nothing but lichens, mosses and some scanty grass, added to this, the South Shetlands are of interest almost solely as a haunt of seals, Albatrosses, penguins and other sea-fowl.

Much whaling is carried on round the Islands, but there is only one shore station situated at Deception Island; however, the whale-Catchers are accompanied by larger vessels used as floating factories.

South Sandwich Islands:

The Islands composing the south Sandwich group are eleven in number, and they are most easterly of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands. The group was discovered by Captain James Cook on Jan. 31st 1775 during his second circumnavigation of the world, but his discoveries were not completed at this time. However, forty five years later, Cook's discoveries were completed and extended by the remarkable work of Captain Fabian Gottlieb Von Bellingshausen of the imperial Russian Navy in the corvettes "Vostok" and Mirnii". Cook had named the group "Sandwich Land", therefore, the Russian Captain after his

discoveries said "Captain Cook saw these Islands first and as he had thus named them, they must stand as a memory of the daring explorer to be handed on to posterity, consequently I call them also Sandwich Islands".

Description of the Islands: The South Sandwich Islands are situated Lat. 56° 18′ and 59° 28′ south, and Long. 26° 14′ and 28° 11′ west; and the northernmost of the group being about 290 miles east half south of south Georgia. However, in all there are 11 Islands, ten of these form a curved chain stretching north and south while one (Leskov) lies to the west of the line near its northern end. The chain is 193 miles in length and is concave to the westward. The largest of the group is Montagu with a circumference of about 24 miles and the smallest is Leskov with a circumference of about 1½ miles. There are also two groups of

Islands as follows: (1) Candlemas group: consisting of Candlemas and Vindication Islands. (2) Southern Thule group: consisting of Thule, Cook and Bellingshausen Islands.

Apart from these, the Islands are widely separated and the distances between them range from 24 to 41 miles.

South Georgia:

An Island in the south Atlantic Ocean about 160 km. Long and 5 to 30 km. wide, with an area of about 4,145 sq. km. The Island is situated approximately 900 miles (about 1452 km.) east by south of the Falkland Islands, and is mountainous with snowy peaks from 1830 to 2438 metres high, and their slopes furrowed with deep gorges filled with glaciers. There is but little flat land, and the island is almost entirely barren, and the south-east side being permanently frozen.

The average temperature at Grytviken on the east is only 1.7° C., and the average annual precipitation is 1,295 mm. . However, so much snow accumulates each year that a great deal or it compacts mainly under its own weight into solid ice which moves downhill towards the sea as large glaciers.

Its geological constitution-gneiss and argillaceous schists with no trace of fossils shows that the island is (like the Falklands) a surviving fragment of some greater land-mass now vanished, most probably indicating a former extension of the Andean system.

The main vegetation is some coarse grass which grows on the north-east side of the island in patches where the snow melts in summer.

There are no indigenous quadrupeds other than seals, but reindeer have been introduced and are thriving.

There are many sea birds including penguins and Albatrosses, added to this, sea elephant, the sea-Leopard, and Weddell's seal frequent its coast.

South Georgia, however, discovered by Amerigo Vespuccio in 1501 – 1502, and Anthony La Roche in 1675, and later by Captain Cook who took possession of it in 1775.

- South Georgia was visited by many polar expeditions, but there was no colonisation until 1904 when Kohl Larsen (a Norwegian) established the first whaling station at Grytviken and financed by the Cie.

 Argentina de Pesca. The island was an important centre of the whaling industry, therefore, more than five other stations were built on sheltered east inlets to exploit the whale population of the surrounding Ocean almost continuously until 1965 when whaling
 - South Georgia is politically attached to the Falkland islands and the chief settlement was at Grytviken on the north coast.

from South Georgia finally stopped.

Antarctica:

It is frozen continent with total area of 5.5 million square miles (14.2 square km.). Nearly all of Antarctica lies south of the Antarctic Circle, the parallel of latitude that is 66 33 south of the equator, and the distance from the south Pole to this latitude is about 1,600 miles (2,500 km. (.

The continent is divided geographically into two unequal sized parts, and the larger has been called Greater Antarctica but is generally known as east Antarctica because most of its lies in east longitudes, and the smaller or lesser Antarctica wholly in west longitudes, is generally called west Antarctica.

Geology: East Antarctica: It is composed of highgrade metamorphic complexes, all of pre-Cambrian age and showing evidence of a long metamorphic history; however in the coastal regions of East

- Pre-Cambrian lower palaeozoic time. After this the folded metamorphic rocks suffered uplift and erosion, and continental sediments were laid down on the new crosion surface. These range in age from lower Devonian to Jurassic, and were intruded by basic dykes and sills in the Jurassic; since that time the basement and the sedimentary cover have been extensively block faulted.
- West Antarctica: is largely underlain by a young fold belt of late Cretaceous and early Tertiary age, separated from East Antarctica by the Ross mobile belt; a belt of Palaeozoic age stretching from the Weddell sea to the Ross sea. This belt contains a thick accumulation of greywackes, shales, carbonate rocks, and volcanics, folded and metamorphosed to a low grade and intruded by large granite masses in

early Palaeozoic times, during the Ross Orogeny; to the west of this belt is the late Cretaceous and early Tertiary belt which show marked similarities to the South American Andean belt, and is linked to it through the Scotia Arc.

The oldest deposits in this belt are of Carboniferous age, and these were folded and metamorphosed before the deposition of Mesozoic sediments ranging in age from Jurassic to Cretaceous; however, these were folded but suffered little metamorphism in the orogeny, and were intruded by large granite batholiths. The present ice sheet reaches out beyond the continental margin in many places, and rises inland to over 4 km, above sea-level.

Climate:

Temperature Winter temperatures rarely reach as high as 52° F (11° C) on the northern Antarctic

Peninsula (the warmest part of the continent) during winds of maritime air and under a cloud cover that restricts radiation loss. Mean temperatures of the coldest months are -4° to -22° F (-22° to -30° C) on the coast, and -40° to -94° F (-40° to -70° C) in the interior; the coldest period on the polar plateau being usually in late August just before return of the sun.

Summer temperatures may reach as high as 59° F (15° C) on the Antarctic Peninsula; elsewhere the temperatures are usually much lower ranging from a mean of about 32° F (O° C) on the coast to between -4° and -31° F (-20° and -35° C) in the interior.

Wind: Fierce winds characterize most coastal regions, particularly of East Antarctica where cold, dense air flows down the steep slopes off interior highlands.

The Katabatic winds which are a surface flow that may be smooth if of low Velocity, but may become

very turbulent, sweeping high any loose snow, if a critical velocity is surpassed. This turbulent air may appear suddenly and is responsible for the brief and localized Antarctic blizzards during which no snow actually falls and skies above are clear.

Winds on the polar plateau are usually light, with monthly mean velocities at the south Pole ranging from about 9 miles per hour in Dec. (summer) to 17 miles per hour in June and July (winter). Wind on the polar plateau are of complex origin and are generated not only by down slope drainage but more commonly by other factors such as the forces initiated by the Earth's rotation.

Flora:

Antarctic plants total about 800 species, of which 350 are lichens. Lichens, although slow growing, are particularly well adapted to Antarctic survival, and

they can endure lengthy high-stress periods in dormancy and almost instantly because photosynthetic when conditions improve. Bryophytes (mosses and liverworts) totaling about 100 species, predominate in maritime regions but mosses can grow nearly everywhere that lichens grow.

Liverworts are reported only from coastal and maritime regions

Numerous species of molds, yeasts, and other fungi, as well as fresh-water algae and bacteria, complete the listing of Antarctic plants; however, these forms are extremely widespread and are reported as far as 87° south latitude. Moreover Antarctic seas are highly productive in plankton plant life, particularly in near-shore, nutrient-rich zones of upwelling. Diatoms, a type of algae, are especially abundant.

Fauna:

About 45 species of birds live south of the Antarctic Convergence, but only three (the emperor penguin, Antarctic petrel, and south Polar Skua) breed exclusively on the continent. Two of the seven penguin species (the emperor and Adelie) are typically Antarctic and are distributed widely around the entire coastline. Gentoo and chinstrap penguins occupy northern Antarctic Peninsula coasts; except for emperors, all of these, in addition to king, rockhopper, and macaroni penguins are found widely in sub-Antarctic island regions.

More than half the Antarctic breeding species of birds belong to the order proce-llariiformes including mainly petrels and a few albatrosses.

The Antarctic and sub-Antarctic birds also include species of cormorants, pintails, grills, terns, sheathbills, and pipits.

Of the nearly 20,000 kinds of modern fish, no more than about 100 are known from seas south of the Antarctic Convergence; however, nearly three-quarters of the 90 or so sea-bottom species belong to the Nototheniiformes (the Antarctic perches). At sea bottom there are also the Zoarcidae or (eel-pouts), the Liparidae (sea snails), the Macrouridae (rat-tailed fishes) and the Gadidae (cod-like fishes).

Antarctic fishes are well adapted to the cold waters; the bottom fish are highly endemic, and 90% of the species being found nowhere else.

Antarctic native mammals are all marine and include seals (pinnipeds) and porpoises, dolphins and whales (cetaceans).

Only one otariid (fur seal) breeds south of the Antarctic Convergence; four species of phocids (true seals), the ubiquitous crab-eater seal, the solitary and

aggressively carnivorous leopard seal, and the rarely seen Ross seal- breed almost exclusively in the Antarctic zone.

Whales and their cetacean relatives, the porpoises and dolphins, range widely from the Arctic to the Antarctic (in all Oceans and seas). A number of species range to the Antarctic Convergence and so are considered only peripheral Antarctic types. There are the killer whale, sperm whale, and rare bottle-nosed or beaked whale. There are also seven species of whalebone inhabit Antarctic waters subsisting on the plentiful krill; however, these include the southern right whale, humpback whale, and four kinds of rorqual (the blue whale, the fine whale, the sei whale, and the lesser rorqual or minke).

The killer whale (one of the most intelligent of marine animals) hunts in packs and feeds on larger creatures

such as fish, penguins and other aquatic birds, seals, dolphins and other whales. Despite the name, there is no authenticated account of attacks on humans near Antarctica. Excessive slaughter in the past has drastically decimated stocks of the larger whales particularly the giant blue whales, the largest mammals on Earth; but the blue whales are now protected by international agreement.

Mineral Resources:

Antarctic mineral resources do exist as does the technology to remove and transport them. However, the high degree of certainty that mineral deposits do indeed exist is based on the close similarity between known geological areas of Antarctic and those of mineral-rich provinces of South America, south Africa and Australia.

A great variety of metal minerals associated with ore deposits on other continents are also reported from Antarctica and include stibnite (antimony), chromite (chromium (chalcocite and copper, gold, lead, molybdenum, tin, and zinc; in addition, there are indications of sedimentary phosphate. Unfortunately none of these deposits is in a location or of size and grade that approaches economic utility.

Antarctic coals have long been known; however, the coals are generally high in ash, fixed carbon, and oxygen and low in hydrogen and sulphur.

Territorial claims and political status:

In fact, a great many nations played important roles in the discovery and exploration of intarctica, but who first saw the continent is clouded in controversy. The Russian expedition leader Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen, the Englishman Edward Bransfield,

and the American Nathaniel Palmer all claim first sightings in 1820 but the most likely first actual sighting was by Bellingshausen.

The early discoveries led to a few controversies not only for territorial claims but also in geographical nomenclature.

The struggle for national influence was especially acute in the slender peninsula land mass south of Scotia sea that became known as O'Higgins land to Chileans and San Martin land to Argentines after national heroes who helped in gaining independence from Spain. To Englishmen, it was known as Graham land after a former first lord of the admiralty, and to Americans as Palmer Peninsula, after Nathaniel Palmer the sealer alleged to have discovered the region in 1820. However, by international agreement, the region is now known simply as the Antarctic

Peninsula (Grahm land its northern half, and Palmer land its southern half).

The first half of the 20th century, however, was the colonial period in the history of Antarctica, and between 1908 and 1942 seven nations decreed sovereignty over pie-shaped sectors of the continent (the seven nations were: Norway, Australia, France, New Zealand, Chile, Great Britain and Argentina). By the mid-1950s, many nations had active Antarctic interests, some commercial, some scientific, and most political.

In 1947-48, Australia had established stations on Heard and Macquarie islands, and in 1954 they built Mawson station on the mainland coast of MacRobertson land as a basis for its vast territorial claim. South Africans raised their flag over Prince Edward and Marion islands. France established

permanent bases by 1953 in the Kerguelen and Crozet islands and surveyed much of the Adelie land coast.

In 1955, Argentina established General Belgrano Station on the Filchner ice shelf; and a profusion of British, Chilean and Argentine bases had been built in close proximity to one another in the peninsula and nearby islands that their purpose seemed more for intelligence activities than for science.

But the U.S.A, and Russia had shown little interest in Antarctica, and continued its policy of non recognition of any claims

The IGY and the Antarctic treaty:

In early 1955, plans were laid for extensive explorations, and 12 nations were to establish more than 50 over wintering stations on the continent and sub-Antarctic islands. However, a meeting (the first

Antarctic conference) was then held in Paris in July 1955 to coordinate plans expeditions.

Coastal bases were established in the summer of 1955-56, and inland stations the next summer for the official opening of IGY on July 1st 1957, and with the final ratification by each of the 12 governments (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, U.S.A, U.K., and U.S.S.R.), the treaty entered into full force on June 23rd, 1961. After the original signing, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, The Netherlands and Romania also acceded to the treaty.

The following are the contents of the Antarctic Treaty:

Article 1: Provides for the peaceful use of Antarctica

Article 2: For international cooperation and freedom
of scientific investigation. Article 3: For free exchange
of plans, scientific results, and personnal. Article 4:

for the nonrenunciation of prior claim rights and for the prohibition of new claims and the citation of any activities during the treaty term as a basis for past or

future claims. Article 5: For prohibition of nuclear explosions or waste disposal. Article 6: For application of the treaty to all areas south of latitude 60° S, excluding the high seas which come under international law. Article 7: For open inspection of any nation's Antarctic operations by any other nation. Article 8: For reference of disputes to the international court of justice if they cannot be settled by peaceful negotiation or arbitration by involved parties. Article 9: For a review of the treaty after it has been in force for 30 years, if such a review is requested by any contracting party.

An important provision of the treaty requires periodic meetings of representatives of signatory nations to

take up occasional problems ; such meetings have agreed upon important measures for conservation of Antarctic flora and fauna and for the preservation of historic sites. [50]

Chapter 2

The History of the Falklands:

The Falkland Islands were first discovered by the Spanish navigator Amerigo vespucci in 1502 A. D. and eight years later (1592) the islands were seen once more by the British navigator John Davis on his way to the Philippines and the coast of China Via Cape Horn. In February 1594, Sir Henry Hawkins sailed along the north shore of the Falkland islands but did not land, and he named the islands Hawkins Maidenland. In 1598, Sebald de Wert (a Dutchman) visited the islands and called them the Sebald island, a name which they bear on some Dutch maps.

Ninety eight years later (1690) captain Strong an Englishman sailed through between the two principal islands and landed upon one of them, and called the passage Falkland sound (this was in honour of Lord

Falkland, the Treasurer of the Navy in London at that time) and by 1745 the name was used to describe the whole group.

The first settlers:

In September 1763, the French explorer de Bougainville sailed from st. Malo in Brittany in North of France to the islands, and in his way down he called at Montevideo (Uruguay) and took on board everything required in the way of livestock to enable a settlement to be started including cows, calves, sheep, goats, pigs, horses and small wolf and dogs. De Bougainville entered Berkeley sound (a spacious inlet of the sea to the north-west of port William harbour) and the settlement established was given the name of St. Louis in the east island. The settlers consisted mainly of French and a few Spanish of Latin America; and on April 5th 1764, de Bougain zille took possession of all the Islands (east and west) in the name of king

Louis XV and the name was applied to the whole islands was Les Isles Malouines.

On April 8th 1764, de Bougainville returned to France leaving behind a few French settlers (less than fifty) and some Spanish people from the mainland. Nine months later, de Bougainville returned to the islands without much success of encouraging settlers; and on April 10th 1765, he returned to France leaving behind about 70 French settlers, but the number of Spanish settlers increased due to the close link between the islands and the mainland of la plate. During the following 15 months, the number of French began to decline and the number of Spanish increased from La Plata, as a result, de Bougainville agreed in October 1766 to transfer his colony to the Spanish government on payment of about \$ 25.000, and in April 1767 the colony was handed over to Spain and the French

governor de Nerville succeeded by the Spaniard Felipe Ruiz Puente, and the name of the islands changed to Las Islas Malvinas. But while the French were settling on east Falkland, the British admiralty dispatched captain John Byron to the Falkland to seek some suitable place for use as a settlement and a base. He landed at Saunders Island on the far west and took possession of this and the neighbouring islands in the name of his king George II and called the settlement and harbour Port Egmont. Byron left Captain Macbride in charge of the new settlement.

However, Spain objected to anyone interfering in the South Atlantic, which she looked upon as her special sphere of interest, and there was much bad feeling between Spain, France and Britain at this time over the Falkland Islands. As a result, the French king sold the Islands to Spain who took possession of the French

settlement and named it Soledad leaving it with a garrison under the authority of the imperial governor at Buenos Aires.

On June 4th 1770, a Spanish frigate entered the harbour of Port Egmont, followed two days later by four more Spanish ships; however, in the port was the sloop Favourite commanded by the British Captain George Farmer, and ashore the only fortifications were a block-house and a mud-built battery mounting four twelve pound guns.

On June 8th, the British commander sent a letter to the commander of the Spanish vessels (Juan Madariaga) requesting him to leave; but Madariaga who had 1,600 Spanish soldiers, requested the departure of the British forces. The British commander refused to yield and on June 10th 1770 the Spanish force landed, as a result, the British commander ordered a flag of

truce to be hoisted, and the British finally surrendered the block-house and settlement to the Spanish on July 14th 1770, and the British forces sailed for England.

The Spanish action nearly brought war between Britain and Spain, and on Sept. 16th 1771 after negotiations, Port Egmont was restored to Britain. Three years later the British abandoned the settlement, an action which is still raised in disputes as to ownership of the islands. The Spaniards continued to reside at their settlement of Soledad until the first part of the next century, when they too withdrew, and for some years the Islands became the hunting ground of whalers and sealers.

In 1820, Colonel Daniel Jewett took possession on behalf of Buenos Aires government, but the e was no successful attempt at settlement until Jouis Vernet arrived there in 1826. And in 1829, ie was appointed named by the newly formed Argentine Republic; however, Vernet established about 90 settlers in the vicinity of Port Louis. After increasing trouble from foreign sealers and whalers, he arrested some American sealers and took them to Buenos Aires, and in reprisal Silas Duncan, commander of the U.S. corvette Lexington, sailed into Port Louis in 1831, destroyed the settlement and arrested Governor Vernet and his soldiers as pirates, later handing them over to the authorities in Montevideo. As a result, Britain sent in Captain Onslow in H.M.S. Clio, and Vernet's successor was ordered out with his Argentine garrison, and departed three days later.

Captain Onslow hoisted the British flag and after entrusting it to william Dickson (the senior British resident on the islands) sailed away a few days later,

leaving him with no garrison to maintain order.

Eight months later Dickson and other settlers were murdered by Indian convicts and gauchos who had been in Vernet's employ. When the murders became known, H.MS. Challenger landed a detachment of marines who restored order in support of the newly appointed Governor, Lieutenant Henry Smith. From 1833 to 1841, the islands were governed by British Naval officers, and the Governor laid out a township which he called Anson, then decided to move to Stanley where he founded what eventually was to be the permanent capital and seat of Government of the Colony; however, the move to Stanley was no doubt because of the ease of beating large sailing ships into harbour as compared with port Louis.

Development of East Falkland began slowly and in 1844 the large area known as Lafonia was sold off to Samuel Fisher Lafone (a Montevideo merchant) together with the right to exploit the wild cattle which had multiplied there from those imported by the French and Spanish. and in 1851 Lafone sold out to the Falkland islands company.

The colonial managers of this chartered company made the first successful attempt to establish sheep-farming on the East island (the company has considerable farming land in the centre and south of the East Falkland and on the West Falkland as well as on a number of islands off the East Falkland. The centenary of the Falkland Islands company was observed in 1951; this company also carries on the local shipping service and has stores in Stanley as well out in the settlements on its farms). In 1854, ship repair trade developed in the colony, and by 1867, it was at its height, but from about 1870 the ship repair trade was in its final decline, steam was replacing sail

and coal could be bought for \$ 2 per ton at Punta

Arenas whereas in the Falklands it was \$3 per ton. West Falklands, however, was not open for colonization until 1867 when the government offered 6,000 acre blocks of land to lessees on condition that they bought 160 acres on each block. J.L.Waldron(a Wiltshire man) was first applicant for this land arriving in a chartered ship the Diane with shepherds, servants, stock and all necessaries for starting his settlement at Port Howard. In 1869, Bishop Stirling was consecrated the first Bishop of the Falkland Islands, having first come out to Keppel as superintendent of the work in 1862. From 1870 to 1880, there was a definite development of sheep farming with the export of wool as the objective, and by 1885 it became self-supporting.

The development of the Falkland islands:

The story of the Falkland Islands from the time of the centenary in 1933 until the present day is of development in various ways, very slowly but nonetheless progressing. The problem was, whoever tried to put forward schemes for the economic and social progress of the Islands came up against the problems of the geographical isolation of the Islands and of the small population. These two barriers mean that communications to the outside world constantly present a difficulty.

The Islands had maintained contact with the outside world through wireless ever since the first Wireless station was erected to the east of Stanley in 1912. During the first world war, the Admiralty built a large Wireless station to the west of Stanley at the head of the bay (this station was used between the two world

wars as the Civil Wireless station under the control of the Falkland Islands government), but when the last war broke out the Wireless station reverted once more to the Admiralty. However, from 1945, Wireless communication has been again in the hands of the Falkland Islands government and a new station was built in 1947 to the east of Stanley (quite close to town) and the large Admiralty station closed down under the charge of a caretaker.

As a result of a communications agreement signed between the British government and the government of the Argentine in July 1971, the Argentine Air Force constructed a temporary airfield close to Stanley, and this was inaugurated in November 1972. Until April 1982 there was a weekly service provided by the Argentine development airline LADE with F 27 aircraft carrying about 20 passengers and freight, linking Comodoro Rivadavia (south of Argentina)

In the meantime, the British with Stanley. government had built by the British Aid Funds a new permanent airport at Cape Pembroke Peninsula (called Stanley airport). There were also (until April 1982) shipping services operating to the islands from the U.K. and from Argentine ports but these did not normally cater for passengers, and a ship on charter to a subsidiary of the Falkland Island company used to make 4 or 5 trips a year carrying general cargo. For the Islands, there were until 1982 relatively few small boats, and the government has a slightly larger vessel on charter to a subsidiary of the Falkland Islands company which carry heavy freight and sea mail to the outlying station and to collect the wool crop. There are also more than 1,000 vehicles which maintain land communications, using the 12 miles of concrete roads in Stanley or the unsurfaced tracks elsewhere when weather permits; however, there are no island roads, although travel between most farm settlements is possible by landrover car , jeep or motor cycle.

Until the war of April 1982, wireless communications were maintained with London, Buenos Aires, South Georgia and British Antarctic territory; moreover, the telephone system in Stanley was in general use and most of the farm stations have their own lines connected with Stanley on the East Falkland and with fox Bay on the West Falkland where there is a wireless station for interinsular traffic; added to this, there used to be a weekly airmail service operating between the mainland of south America and Stanley.

The people:

In 1924, the population was estimated at 2,197 persons and the majority of the inhabitants were living in east Falkland. The pre-dominating element being Scottish

shepherds. And in 1970 the population was estimated at 2,000, but in 1979 was 1,776 just three years before the war of April 1982. Of these 75% were born in the Falklands, and 98% have British nationality and, 60% belong to the Church of England and 25% to other Protestant denominations, and 15% are Roman Catholic. The pattern of living on the Islands is sharply divided between that of small, isolated sheepfarming communities and the wide cross section of interests represented in Stanley. In the capital live government officials, professional groups, technicians, artisans, and the personnel of the British Antarctic survey, the Radio and space research station, and the telecommunications centre.

The economy:

The economy is entirely dependent on the production of wool for export. Outside Stanley the whole area of the Islands is given over to sheep farming, and half the male population is employed in this industry. However, farms vary in size from 3,600 acres to 161,000 acres, and there are over 600,000 sheep producing an average of about half a million pounds of wool annually; this is sold in Britain and is the Islands's only resource. There is some revenue from customs duties levied on wines, spirits, malt liquids and tobacco. A comprehensive economic survey on the Islands published in mid-1976, drew attention to the potential for exploitation of fish, especially krill and blue whiting, kelp and possibly petroleum, and made recommendations for various areas of There are also some studies in development. horticultural expansion, tourism, investigations into

commercial fishing and fish drying, tanning of hides and skins, and the development of petroleum exploitations as well as improving internal communications and educational and medical facilities.

The Constitution and government:

Until 1950, the head of the administration of the Colony was a Governor and Commander in chief who was appointed by the British government for a period of five years at a time. The Governor was advised by an Executive Council consisting of four official and two non-official members.

As for the Legislative council, it was reconstituted in 1949 to allow for elected representatives of the people taking their seats as follows: two for Stanley, one member for the East and one for the West Falkland; and the council comprised the three Senior Officials in the administration (the Colonial Secretary, the Senior

Medical Officer and the Agricultural Officer), and three other nominated members, four elected members and two nominated unofficial members. There was also local government confined to Stanley where was a Town Council which was composed of six elected members and three members nominated by the Governor. The members of the Council elect one of their numbers as Chairman for each ensuing year. In 1964, the constitutions of both Executive and Legislative Councils were altered to allow for a clear non-official majority. By 1980, the Legislative Council consisted of: the Governor as president, the chief secretary and the financial secretary, and six elected members who represent East and West Falkland, East and West Stanley, Camp Division and Stanley Division respectively, and elections are held every four years.

The Battle of the Falkland Islands

One of the principal actions of world war 1, known as the Battle of the Falklands, was fought on Dec. 8th 1914, to the south-eastward of the Falkland Islands, between a British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee and a German squadron under Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee. The two battle-cruisers (Invincible and Inflexible) had been detached from the Grand Fleet in the North Sea and sent with all dispatch to reinforce the British squadron in the south Atlantic; and Admiral Sturdee's orders on leaving England in the invincible were to seek out and destroy the enemy.

The following table shows the details of the rival

forces:						
Country	Type	Ships	Guns	Nominal		
				speed		
	Battle	Invincible	8-12 in.	26 Knots		
	cruisers	Inflexible	8-12 in.	26 Knots		
		Carnarvon	4-7.5 in., 6	22 Knots		
	Armoured	Cornwall	6-in	23.5 Knots		
	cruisers	Kent	14-6in.,	23.5 Knots		
British			14-6 in.,			
		Glasgow	2-6 in., 10-	25 Knots		
	Light	Bristol	4in.	24 Knots		
	cruisers		2-6 in., 10			
			4-in.			
	Armed	Mecedonia	••••	•••••		
	merchant					
	cruiser					

[70]

	Armoured	Scharnhorst	8-8.2 in.,	
	cruisers		8-8.2 in.,	23 Knots
		Gneisenau	8-8.2 in.,	
			6-5.9 in.,	23 Knots
German		Leipzing	10-4.1 in.,	23 Knots
	Light	Nurnberg	10-4.1 in.,	23.5 Knots
	cruisers	Dresden	10-4.1 in.,	24 Knots
		Seydlitz		
	Ships	Baden	*********	
		Santa Isabel		

After the defeat of Admiral Cradock's squadron at Coronel, the battleship canopus had returned to the Falkland Islands and was berthed on the mud in Port Stanley, the inner harbour. Her light guns had been erected on shore and the entrance to the harbour mined with electric mines constructed out of old oil

drums. A signal station had been erected and the local volunteers organized as a defence force.

On his arrival at Port William on December 7th 1914, Admiral Sturdee ordered the Macedonia to patrol outside the harbour, and the Inflexible and Kent to be ready for 14 Knots at half-an-hour's notice and the other ships of his squadron to keep steam for 12 Knots at two hours notice. As only three colliers were available, all ships could not coal at once, and by A.M. on December 8th 1914, the Carnarvon and Glasgow had finished coaling, and the Invincible and Inflexible then began. However, the Bristol had her fires out to remedy defects and the Cornwall had one engine opened up at six hours notice; also the Glasgow was repairing machinery and could not be ready for two hours. At 7.50 A.M., the observation post on Sapper's Hill reported two strange ships in sight, and

at 7.55 A.M. the Glasgow fired a gun to draw attention to a signal flying in the canopus, making known this report. As a result, a scene of activity ensued, and colliers were cast off and preparations made for leaving harbour; in the meantime, the Kent was ordered to weigh and observe the enemy; however, the general signal to weigh was made at 8.14 A.M. and at 8.30 A.M. action was sounded off and all ships were striving to raise steam at the earliest possible moment. The two ships which had been sighted were the Gneisenau and Nurnberg which Von Spee had sent on ahead to reconnoitre, they were not visible from the Canopus, but with the aid of an extemporized observation hut which had been established on the hill, she opened fire on them at 9.15 A.M. with her 12 in. guns, but the range was too great and the shots fell short; nevertheless, the firing made the two German ships turn away to the south-east.

The German Von Spee in the Scharnhorst was some 15 miles distant from the harbour, but the clouds of smoke visible over the intervening land made him suspicious. The Gneisenau was near enough to make out the masts and funnels of six ships in the harbour, and worse still, some observers thought they could distinguish the tripod masts of battle-cruisers. The report from the Gneisenau confirmed Von Spee in his misgivings and he immediately ordered the advanced ships not to accept action, and this order was followed by a general signal to his squadron to raise steam in all boilers and steer east.

It is difficult to be sure with what intention Admiral Von Spee made for the Falkland Islands; probably, he expected to find there a British squadron weaker than his won, which he hoped to draw to the Sea and destroy and then occupy the Islands. Von Spee's position if the British squadron brought him to action in the open was hopeless, but if the Germans had pressed home an attack at the entrance to the harbour, the prospects would have been far from pleasant for the British forces within.

By 10.15 A.M. on Dec. 8th 1914, all the British ships, excepting the Bristol had steam up and 15 minutes later they had cleared the harbour, and the German ships were hull-down to the south-east (some 12 to 13 miles distant). In the meantime, Admiral Sturdee gave an order for each ship to steam at her utmost speed in pursuit. At 10.50 A.M. it became evident that the British ships were gaining and Sturdee ordered the Glasgow ship to keep three miles ahead, and the Inflexible to keep on the port quarter on the

Invincible. By 11 A.M. the German ships were clearly visible and the battle-cruisers reduced speed to 24 knots. The Carnarvon and Cornwall ships were left behind their best speed being 20 knots. Sturdee therefore reduced the speed of the squadron to 19 knots in order to avoid his ships becoming too widely scattered, and he ordered the crews to be piped to dinner. The German squadron was doing little more than 15 knots per hour; however, the German auxiliaries had been sighted from the islands, and the Bristol ship which by extraordinary exertions had managed to raise steam and was just leaving the harbour, was ordered to take Macedonia under her orders and destroy the transports. At 12.20 the British ships increased their speed to 22 Knots, and by 12.50 P.M. The British battle-cruisers were steaming at 25 knots and were rapidly overtaking the Germans. Fire was opened by the Inflexible on the Leipzig at a range of 16,000 yards. As a result, Von Spee ordered his light cruisers to scatter and make for the South American coast in order to save them and they turned away southward at about 1.20 P.M. As his light cruisers left him, Von Spee turned eastward to accept action from the British. Fire was opened on both sides, but the range was too great (about 14,000 yd.). The range closed to 12,500 yd. And at about 1.45 P.M. the British Invincible was hit, whereupon Sturdee turned away to open the range and obtain full advantage from his heavier armament, and his object was to annihilate the Germans, but in doing so to receive as little damage as possible. By 2 P.M. the range had increased to 16,000 yd., and firing ceased for a time.

In order to renew the action, the British battlecruisers altered course to starboard, and gradually reduced the range to 15,000 yd. Fire was then reopened and Von Spee again accepted action, and manoeuvring his ships to reduce the range sufficiently for his secondary armament to be brought into action, the Germans began to fire with their 5.9 in. guns. With their superior speed the British were able to keep the range as they wished, and the British guns began to inflict severe damage on the German ships. By 3.15 P.M. the German showed signs of damage and their ship Scharnhorst was set on fire. Sturdee then, turned the battle-cruisers round to port, and Von Spee replied by turning his ships, and the action ran to the south-westward . By 4 P.M. the Scharnhorst was suffering terribly, but she continued to fire gamely with her remaining guns and her end came at

4.20 P.M. when she turned completely over and sank with flag flying, and no one was saved .After the Scharnhorst sank, the German cruiser Gneisenau became a target for a concentrated fire from three directions, and by 5.4 P.M. her splendid fight against hopeless odds was at an end and she heeled slowly over and sank at about 6 P.M. At 2.55 P.M. The Glasgow opened fire on the German ship Leipzig and by 4.15 P.M. the Cornwall had closed the range sufficiently to bring guns into action. The Leipzig suffered considerably under the cross-fire from the two British cruisers; and her speed was falling so rapidly that her attackers were in the fortunate position of being able to keep the range as they desired; and by 7 P.M. the Leipzig's stern was enveloped in flames and she was in sorry plight, but

she made no sign of surrender. Then at 9.30 P.M., there was an explosion and the Leipzing disappeared. Meanwhile, the British ship Kent had been pursuing the German ship Nurnberg, and at 5 P.M. the Nurnberg opened fire, but the 6-in. guns of the Kent were not yet within range, and the weather was becoming thick, owing to a fine drizzle having set in, when fortune favoured the pursuer. However, the Nurnberg's boiler tubes gave out and her speed sank rapidly which enabled the British ship Kent to close to effective range, and by 6.30 P.M. the Nurnberg was a blazing wreck and about 7.30 P.M. she turned over and sank. At the same time, two of the German colliers had been overtaken by the British ships Bristol and Macedonia, and they were captured at about 4 P.M. The following table shows the casualties of the

British and German forces:

Ship	Hits received	Casualties	Rounds fired			
British:						
	22	0 killed & I	573 12 in.			
Invincible		wounded				
	3	1 killed & 2	661 12 in.			
Inflexible		wounded				
	2	1killed & 4	316 6 in.			
Glasgow		wounded				
	18	0 killed & 0	1000 6 in.			
Cornwall		wounded				
	36	4 killed & 12	646 6 in.			
Kent		wounded				
	0	0killed & 0				
Carnarvon		wounded				
German:						

Scharnhorst	Sunk	All lost	•••••
Gneisenau	Sunk	187 saved	
Leipzing	Sunk	18 saved	
Nurnberg	Sunk	7 saved	
Dresden	Escaped		

The battle of the Falkland Islands was a very decisive victory for the British, and as a result, the German cruiser warfare collapsed and England held outside the narrow seas undisputed control of the ocean trade routes of the world

The Dependencies of the Falkland Islands

In 1917, attention was drawn to the question of the development of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands in several memoranda prepared by Mr. E.R. Darnley of the colonial office, and submitted to the secretary of state for the Colonies. And in August 1917, the Colonial office addressed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject with special reference to the preservation of the whaling industry and possibility of the development of other industries, and with the letter was forwarded a note on the economic resources of this area and a memorandum by Dr. R.N. Rudmose Brown of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition discussing a proposal made by the colonial office for the dispatch of a Research Vessel for the study of whales and

whaling. It was pointed out in the letter that excessive hunting had resulted in the collapse of the whaling industry in the Greenland and Spitsbergen water, and that the information as to conditions in the southern hemisphere was at present insufficient to warrant a final decision whether there was any danger of a similar collapse of the whaling industry in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands.

It was suggested that the investigations of a research expedition in that area might include hydrography, meteorology, magnetism, and tidal work; and it was noted that the governments of India, Egypt and the Union of South Africa might be interested in such investigation, especially in those relating to meteorology, and the letter recalled the fact that, out of half a dozen fully equipped scientific expeditions that had worked in these regions, only one had been

British, and that at the present time the actual whaling was carried out almost entirely by The general proposals made in the Norwegians. letter met with a cordial response from the Admiralty and the British Museum, and the other Departments addressed, and Falkland Islands to advise him on the However, the terms of reference to whole subject. the Committee, as finally laid down after the Committee had considered them at its first meeting were to consider what can be done to facilitate prompt action at the conclusion of the war in regard to the preservation of the whaling industry and to the development of other industries in the Dependencies of the Falkland islands, and to consider not only the economic questions above referred to and the scheme for the employment of a research vessel, but also what purely scientific investigations are most required in

connection with these regions and whether any preliminary inquiries by experts in this country should be instituted.

Government:

administered by the Governor of the Falkland Islands who is empowered by letters patent to make laws for the Dependencies by and with the advice and consent of the legislative council of the Falkland Islands. The executive council of the Dependencies consists of such persons as from time to time constitute the executive council of the Falkland Islands. Moreover, Ordinance no. 9 of 1908 of the Legislature of the Falkland Islands provides for bringing the laws of the colony into force in the Dependencies, but no Ordinance of the colony applies to the Dependencies unless expressly declared by notification in the

Falkland Islands Gazette to be in force there; also any ordinance of the colony which applies to the Dependencies is in force there so far only as the local circumstances permit and subject to such qualifications as those circumstances rendernecessary.

The jurisdiction of the supreme court of the colony applies to the Dependencies, and the Governor is empowered to appoint such magistrates and other officers as may be necessary. A part from the staff of the meteorological station at Laurie Island, south Orkneys, south Georgia is the only Dependency which is permanently inhabited, the islands being the seat of a whaling industry which is carried on all the year round. Added to this, the establishment provided by the government at south Georgia consists of a stipendiary magistrate, two customs officers and a

police constable. The revenue and expenditure of the Dependencies are respectively paid into, and met from the general revenue of the Falkland Islands.

The whaling industry:

Whaling by modern methods was first carried on in these Dependencies by the compania Argentina de Peasca which began operations at South Georgia in December 1904, and was subsequently granted, as from the 1st January 1906, a lease of Grytviken Harbour for the establishment of a whaling station. However, the first modern whaling expedition to the South Shetlands was that of Mr. Alexander Lange which worked in that Dependency during the season 1905-1906; but between 1909 and 1911, seven other leases were granted at South Georgia. Meanwhile, the number of floating factories employed at the South Shetlands went on increasing and a whaling lease was

granted at Deception Island. Owing to the lack of convenient sites and to the extended area over which whaling is carried on in the South Shetlands, it has not been practicable to establish any shore station except that at Deception Island, and the bulk of whaling in this Dependency continues to be carried on by floating factories.

During the first world war, whale oil became of great importance as a source of glycerine; therefore, government restrictions were relaxed, and the number of whale catchers allowed at South Georgia was increased. In the meantime, floating factories had been diverted to war services elsewhere, and the number of whale catchers employed at the South Shetlands had fallen off, added to this, the whaling fleet had sustained heavy losses from German submarines.

The principal products of the industry are whale oil, guano and coarse whalebone; and of these the whale oil is by far the most valuable.

Note: Until 1965, when the whaling from South Georgia finally stopped, there was no British personal possessing the special skill and experience required either for the capture of the whales or for the utilization of the carcasses, and the men employed for these purposes including the staffs of land stations and floating factories, the crews of the latter and the gunners and crews of the whale catchers were almost all Norwegian and few Argentinian.

Regulation of the industry until 1965:

The control of the industry by the government of the Falkland Islands has been made possible by the fact that, although most of the whales were caught outside territorial waters, they cannot be commercially

utilized without the employment of the harbours. The main objects of the control exercised by the Colonial government were to conserve the industry by limiting the number of whale catchers allowed to hunt whales, to prevent the destruction of whale calves, either directly or indirectly through the killing of nursing mothers and to minimize waste in the manufacture of the carcasses. The efforts of the colonial government to minimize waste have been hampered by the terms of four of the South Georgia leases in 1930₈.

The Colonial government had derived some revenue from rents, license fees and taxation of whale oil.

Geology and Mineralogy:

The Geology of the area is extremely varied in formations, structure, and rock types, and there is much work to be done on the scientific side which of is great interest. It is possible that such work may lead

physical conditions, the opening up and exploitation of mineral wealth in the dependencies would be attended by serious difficulties. These should not prove insuperable if valuable deposits are discovered.

The occurrence of coal is not impossible, and would probably be in sufficiently large quantities to exploit, and copper has already been discovered, as well as sulphur in the South Sandwich islands.

Chapter (3)

The disputed Islands The Islands were first seen in 1502 by the Spanish

navigator Amerigo Vespucci, and by the British navigator John Davis in 1592, but the first settlers were the French at Port Louis (East Falkland) in 1764. A year later, the British settled Port Egmont (Saunders Islands) in West Falkland. In 1766, the French sold their interests to Spain who took possession of the French settlement and named it Soledad and left it with a garrison under the authority of the imperial Governor at Buenos Aires.

The British withdrew their settlement but not their claim to the Islands, and in 1774 a brief clash followed resulted in the British surrender of their settlement to the Spanish. But in 1812, the Spanish left the Islands and the newly-independent territory which

became Argentina assumed succession to areas of Spanish sovereignty including the disputed Falkland Islands.

In 1820, a frigate was sent to formally possess the Islands and from 1826 the Argentines revived the old Spanish settlement on East Falkland under Louis Vernet. And in 1831, Vernet seized three U.S. sealing schooners and in revenge the Americans sacked the Argentine settlement after a period of lawlessness in which Vernet's successor was murdered the British (whom had formally revived their claim in 1829 and returned to the Islands) removed the few Argentines remaining and left control in the hands of the senior British resident, but there was no British garrison, therefore, former employees of Vernet murdered the senior British resident and six others. When the murders had been discovered, the British sent HMS

Challenger which landed a detachment of marines to restored order in support of the newly appointed Governor Lieutenant Henry Smith, and from 1834 to 1841 naval officers acted as superintendents of the Islands. And in 1841, the first of the resident governors, R.C. Moody, was appointed and then steeps were taken to increase the tiny population and fully settle the Islands.

The Argentine claim is based in fact upon its assumed succession to the Spanish settlement of East Falkland from 1766, and its own formal claim over the Islands from 1820 till 1833 when the British ousted them from the Islands, and ever since 1833 the Argentines accused the British of occupying the islands.

A hundred and thirty two years later (1965) the Argentines registered at the United Nations their desire to negotiate a transfer of sovereignty, and therefore the U.N. instructed both sides to begin talks
which have continued ever since 1965 until the
beginning of the conflict on April 2nd 1982.

The Argentines were encouraged to pursue a negotiated settlement by the fact that almost every British minister with whom they dealt came to recognize at least the de facto force of their claim. In August 1966, George Brown had become Foreign Secretary after a good deal of spadework on Latin American Affairs had been done by his predecessor, Michael Stewart. A month later in Sep. 1966, the Falklands issue suddenly achieved unusual prominence when a group of Argentine citizens seized an aeroplane in Patagonia and ordered the pilot to fly to Port Stanley, and on the arrival at Port Stanley, the Argentine commando arrested the British officials and announced the liberation of the Islands. The following

day another, commando group machine-gunned the British embassy in Buenos Aires aiming for what they thought was the room of Prince Philip on a visit to Argentina, but Prince Philip was not on that side of the Embassy.

The hi-jacked plane steadily sank into the peat of Port Stanley race course, and it was unable to take off again, and as a result, the young Peronists called "The condor Group" eventually surrendered and sent back to Argentina where they were tried and sentenced for hi-jacking.

In Sep. 1967,Lord George Brown went to New York and met Mr. Costa Mendez(the Argentine foreign Minister), and it was reported later that Mr. Costa Mendez was left with the impression that Britain had no wish to hold on to the territory, but would need guarantees and mechanisms to preserve the way of life

bent over backwards to meet every British objection, and suggested that Argentina goodwill would swiftly pay off in increased orders for British exports. By the end of Feb. 1968, there was an agreement in sufficient draft for the first leaks to come from Whitehall when Chalfont (a junior Minister at the Foreign Office) not only accepted the Foreign Office line that Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands was in the long run inevitable, but he had helped to formulate it.

In early March 1968, George Brown resigned as foreign Secretary and deputy leader of the Labour Party, and he was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Michael Stewart. By mid-March 1968, Michael Stewart called in the Argentine Ambassador Brig. Eduardo Mcloughlin and told him that Britain had always promised to look after the interests of the

Islanders. Brig. Mcloughlin told Mr. Stewart: I am not clear whether I should negotiate with the British government who claims to be the sovereign power or with the 2,000 Islanders. Mr. Stewart did not reply and the Argentine ambassador added: "You could not give 2,000 Islanders an absolute veto over the British foreign policy".

Mr. Stewart's point of view was that if the wishes of the Islanders were to be paramount, then they had the power of veto, but if the interests of the Islanders were to be paramount that meant that the final decision lay with the British government and that was the right way. As a result, the Argentine ambassador began to press Mr. Stewart in private, while the House of Commons were pressing him in public. In the meantime, Lord Chalfont went to the Falklands and his main purpose of the visit was to persuade the

Islanders of the advantages of an Agreement with Argentina. He told them that there would be better communications and economic development to make up for the falling price of wool. He put his arguments with elegance and considerable charm, but he got nowhere. The root of the problem was the Islanders hostility to any prospect of Argentine rule and this was at least partly a prejudice based on ignorance. In London, however, Mr. Wilson's Cabinet met to decide whether to proceed with the Foreign Office plan to cede sovereignty. The foreign office plan was as to be that the British Labour Government would agree to Argentine sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be fixed; the date to be decided when Britain was satisfied with Argentine guarantees about the interests of the Islanders. The Argentines, in fact, agreed to recognise the Islanders British nationality

which they could keep as could any other British subjects whom lived in Argentina; there was even a specific time scale, with Britain agreeing that recognition would come not less than four years and not more than 10 years after the agreement.

It was an inconclusive discussion, and Mr. Stewart did not argue strongly for the deal, at the same time, most of the Labour government said that the wishes of the islanders were to be paramount, and as a result, Mr. Stewart acknowledged that even if the Cabinet were to back the deal, he did not look forward to steering the necessary legislation through a hostile House of Commons. Finally Mr. Harold Wilson agreed with the Cabinet and Mr. Stewart and he said there is not much point in going ahead with it.

In fact, the agreement had been worked out over almost two years(from August 1968 to mid 1970) of [101]

talks with members of the Labour Cabinet, and during this time arrangements had advanced to the point when Lord Chalfont went to the Falklands to explain the agreement to the Islanders, and a visit to the Queen was under active Argentina by In mid-1970, the Argentine consideration. Ambassador Mr. Mcloughlin said that the election of a Conservative Government had resulted in a slowdown of the talks. The 1970 election had seen the return of a Conservative Government led by Edward Heath that was bound by a commitment made by sir Alec Douglas Home " to strike sovereignty form the agenda" of any further talks. But Britain had already agreed to hold talks with Argentina about sovereignty under U.N. auspices in 1965, and as a result, Sir David Scott (the assistant secretary at the Foreign Office) suggested to his minister Joseph Godber that the

Argentines could by their own initiative on communications and so on transform the climate of negotiation, reassure the Islanders and build up confidence to the point where the Islanders would accept that their future lay with Argentina.

Sir David Scott invited three Islanders to London in July 1970 to attend preliminary Anglo-Argentine talks, and the first success at the July talks came when both sides(Argentina and Britain) agreed that future talks should be held in Buenos Aires and in London rather than on the neutral ground of New York. The climate for negotiation was further improved in Feb. 1971 when the Argentines flew in a seaplane to evacuate a medical emergency, and a lighthouse keeper on the Islands.

On July 1st, 1971 a year after the talks had begun, a communications agreement was signed which was to

end the isolation of the Falklands. The Argentines had been persuaded by the British government to separate the issue of sovereignty and communications, also they had agreed to freeze talk on sovereignty while discussing other matters(it was being understood that progress on these other matters could pave the way for a transfer of sovereignty in the long term) .In fact, much of the credit for this success went to the Argentine negotiator Mr. Juan Carlos Beltramino. The Argentines in the period after July 1971 were generous. They began a regular seaplane service to the Islands and offered to build a temporary airstrip pending Britain's fulfillment of her obligation to build a permanent runway; but Britain's second undertaking under the 1971 agreement to provide a shipping link was never honoured. Britain's promise to build a permanent runway was to wait for eight long years before it was operational even then it was too short for anything but internal Argentine flights; but the Argentines lived up to their promises; and they spent money, offered scholarships, tried to promote Boy Scout exchanges and tourism. In fact, they tried very hard to win the Islanders hearts and minds. But these, improved communications did not warm the Islanders to their Argentine neighbours. The more the Islanders saw the Argentines the less they liked them.

The Islanders insisted that they wanted to remain British, but what they really meant was that they wanted no changes. They did not want oil rigs, or fishing fleets and freezer plants or hordes of tourists or new banks; they did not want even a British military garrison. They wanted to keep themselves to themselves; in other words: they did not want to lose

their Governor in his colorful uniform with his cooked hat and ostrich feathers, and above all they were frightened of any kind of changes which might be an end to their placid remote way of life.

Within a year of that communications agreement being signed, change had begun, first with the sea plane service with newspapers and magazines in English, and the prospect of being in London within 48 hours rather than six weeks. However the Islanders did not like it at all, and the first sign of that was their protest during the opening of the temporary metal airstrip which was built by the Argentines in Nov. 1972.

The Argentines, continued readiness to operate the 1971 communications agreement was in good faith, they even extended it by signing with Britain the fuel oil agreement in September 1974 which offered to

spare Britain the burden of providing petrol, oil, and lubricants to the Islands. But for some of the Islanders this fuel oil agreement looked sinister even though it promised cheaper fuel.

The talks about communications which started in 1971 were going on until the end of 1974, when the Argentines said that the talk had simply stopped because the British government was talking only about communications but not sovereignty which was their way of buying time.

The Conservative government knew that they could be brought down if they tried to go against the wishes of the Islanders, but the Argentines did not realise this until too late; and as a result the mood in Argentina changed against the British once more especially after the death of General Peron, and some members of the Peronist movement began a campaign to end the 1971

communications agreement and to impose a blockade upon the Islands. And in response to the growing patriotic clamour, the Argentine government in Jan. 1975 tightened its immigration controls over access to the Islands, making the British tourists who wanted to visit the Islands wait five days for their visa. Moreover, in Feb. 1975, the crisis came to Port Stanley when an Argentine cruise ship refused to fly the courtesy flag of the red ensign(the British merchant flag) and the Governor of the Islands said: no flag, No tourists ashore.

In September 1975, James Callaghan(the British

Foreign Secretary) was trying very hard to convince
the Argentines of British goodwill, but in fact,
Britain's attempt at showing good faith was linked
with major arms sale to Argentine. At the same time
as Mr. Callaghan took over the government in Britain,

[108]

General Jorge Videla seized power in Buenos Aires, and it seemed to the British government that the departure of the Peronists might lead to less trouble over the Islands. As a result, the new British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland believed that there was a slim chance of using the Shackleton report to draw the Argentines into a new agreement.

The Shackleton report at the end of 1975 was indeed a major disappointment, however, the report was clear on two fundamentals: First, that there could be no real economic development in the Falklands without Argentine good-will and co-operation whether in enforcing a 200-mile fishing zone (which could earn \$ 3 millions a year in Russian and Polish licence fees alone), or in drilling for oil. Second, which is the most important, that the Islanders themselves were in a feudal status, conditioned by generations of

dependence on the Falkland Islands Company, on their Governors, and on the British Government. They were conditioned not to think or choose for themselves.

Mr. Crosland(British Foreign Secretary) believed that the only way to win over the Argentines was to put sovereignty back on the negotiating table as part of an overall package. On Feb. 2nd, 1977, Crosland told the House of Commons that Ted Rowlands who was very close to the Foreign Secretary would go out to asses the Islanders views. Rowlands got on well with the Islanders; he was frank with the council telling them that the options drawn up in Cabinet papers before he came out included a condominium and even a leaseback, but he wanted to get the Islanders views first. In fact, he covered more ground in the Islands than any previous British official had

he won their trust, just as the Islanders had won his romantic Welsh heart. A few days later, Rowlands announced that any change in sovereignty must stem from economic co-operation, from a growing climate of trust between British and Argentina. But the Argentines said bluntly that any economic co-operation must stem from a change in sovereignty.

In fact, Rowland's terms of reference did not stop at the Falkland, his draft specifically included discussions on sovereignty over South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. The Argentines finally accepted the new terms of reference which led the new British Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen to announce the breakthrough discreetly in the form of a written answer to the Commons. But the hard-liners among the Islanders felt that the Rowlands visit to the Islands

was the prelude to a sell-out, as a result, pressure began to mount for a reformed legislative council with a majority of elected members in the Islands to whittle away the Governor's influence.

In October, 1977 the new constitution came into force, and it provoked a predictable Argentine response; but in the meantime, the Argentine Air Force began an ominous series of over flights across the Islands.

Rowlands flew off to Rio to meet the Argentine negotiators and the Falkland Islands Council Delegation in an optimistic mood. The Islanders had insisted on Rio because they did not want to meet on Argentine soil, even though the Argentines had chartered them an executive jet to get there. Finally, Rowlands won the grudging support of the Islanders, and they agreed that talks could go ahead.

Rowlands's report was clear about two points: first, that Britain should and could retain sovereignty over the Islanders. In fact, it was the people not the land itself which lay at the heart of the lobby in Parliament; second, Rowlands was prepared to trade the oil and mineral wealth in return for peace for the Islanders. Up to that time, the Argentines had so far fulfilled every agreement they had made, they had kept the communications treaty, they had maintained the flights, and the medical facilities, and even if the islanders were no longer taking up the scholarships to Argentine schools, the scholarships were still on offer.

Military Situation

(during James Callaghan's period)

In early 1976, when Anglo-Argentinian relations approached an all-time low, and the diplomatic dealings had been almost broken off, and when in

March 1976 the military coup in Argentina took over, Mr. Callaghan sent a frigate to the Islands, a gesture which did something to cheer up the Islanders against any Argentine invasion. Mr. Callaghan, however, kept a weather eye on the raw material of intelligence. It was not until October 1977, when the Argentine Admiral Emilio Massera (who was in charge of the Navy) backed the base on Southern Thule. The firing upon the Shackleton, and his preparations for naval manoeuvres which alarmed the British naval attache, and Governor James Parker who sent an urgent cable asking for reinforcements, therefore, the Callaghan Cabinet's defence and oversea policy (DOP) committee (which included the foreign secretary Dr. David Owen, the defence minister Mr. Fred Mulley and the energy minister Mr. Tony Benn) agreed to send two frigates (Phoebe and Alacrity) and the nuclear submarine HMS Dreadnought. The shadow task force was not made public, but the Argentines were informed of its presence by the Americans.

With the arrival of Mrs. Thatcher's government in May 1979, Lord Carrington became Foreign Secretary and Nicholas Ridley became Minister of State with responsibility for the Falklands. Ridley had decided to visit the Islands and simply hear what the Islanders had to suggest; and in July 1979, he paid a fact-finding visit to Latin America and including Port Stanley. Ridley was much impressed by the need to halt the depopulation of the Islands by reaching some settlement with Argentina, as the 1976 Shackleton report had indicated, this had become the prerequisite for stable development; but after his visit to Port Stanley Ridley felt that the Islanders wanted

no change at all, no Argentines, no oil rigs, no economic development, in other words nothing at all. Mr. Ridley went to Buenos Aires, and the prospects for restoring full diplomatic relations looked promising with the Argentines convinced that Mrs. Thatcher's government would be much more sympathetic to their staunch anti-communism; and the Argentines were eager to please her minister. When Ridley left Buenos Aires, he was certain that the Argentines had no real interest in oil, and very little in the Antarctic, and they did not want to inhabit the cold Islands, but what they wanted was the symbol of sovereignty and this would give Buenos Aires the nominal sovereignty they wanted, while maintaining British sovereignty over the people. Ridley, however, put this ideas to the British Cabinet, and with Lord Carrington's support, received the go-ahead.

In fact, the Falklanders were supported by a small but extremely forceful lobby in London which had been able to weld an alliance of Commons backbenchers between right-wing defenders of Britain's overseas possessions and left-wing opponents of the Argentine military regime. The Islands also became the political symbol of British freedoms threatened by an increasingly authoritarian world; moreover, Mrs. Thatcher was less tolerant, she attempted to prevent the proposal even reaching cabinet committee; she did see no reason for giving anything to the Argentines and certainly no reason for further arousing backbench sentiment already seething over Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, but she finally backed down when Mr. Ridley persisted.

Rridley, was however, permitted only to take a set of options to the Islanders and consult over them . The

options were, for condominium, for leaseback, or for a freeze of the status quo for a set period of time.

In November, 1980, he went to Port Stanley, and his mission was presented as purely consultative, and his party included only the head of the Foreign Office's South American Department Mr. Patrick Fearn, Mr. Ridley's private secretary and the governor Mr. Rex Hunt acting as chairman for public meetings held in every part of the Islands. Mr. Ridley's mission was, however, attended by up to 60 Argentine journalists, giving it a flavour unlikely to allay Islanders fears. Ridley, in fact, was straight-forward, he told the Islanders that Britain would do her best but her continued defence is a risky business, and it could all go terribly wrong if the Argentine use their force. However, he told the Islanders that: this is the last chance, and he could sell the idea of a lease back to the

Argentines. The younger and more cosmopolitan

Islanders tended to be sympathetic to some

accommodation with Argentina, and the view was that

more than half were convinced, and might have

accepted some form of leaseback.

Ridley, however, tried to build goodwill between the lobby group, the Falkland Islands committee and the Argentines, and he did believe that the only procedure that would work was to get some kind of support from the Islanders that would defuse the opposition in the House of Commons, then gain the Commons assent to get full endorsement from the Islanders, and then sit down with the Argentines to tell them that this is the only deal on offer.

On December 2nd 1980, Ridley made his statement in the House of Commons. He was greeted with howls of outrage, and every speaker from all sides of the house

expressed concern at the outcome of his visit, despite his statement that "any eventual settlement will have to be endorsed by the Islanders and by this house". Ridley felt devastated by the attack, and he reckoned then that the unholy alliance of anti-fascist Labour and sentimental Tories had opened the way to war or national humiliation, and that the last and best chance had gone. A month later (Jan, 1981), the Islands legislative council voted for a freeze on the sovereignty talks for the next 25 years. And in Feb. 1981, Mr. Ridley had to go to New York for renewed talks with the Argentine representative Mr. Carlos Cavandoli, with nothing but the freeze option to offer the Argentines. However, at these talks, Mr. Ridley asserting again that no agreement could be reached without the Islanders consent, and he encouraged the Argentines to talk directly with the two members of the Islands council with him in New York (Mr. Adrian Monk and Mr. Stuart Wallace).

The Argentines continued to try, inviting the two Falklands councilors to talks at which they promised to make the Malvinas "the most pampered region of Argentina". They said there would be tax breaks, development, money to be made, democratic form of government, a different legal system, different customs, a different form of education. But the two Islanders replied that they could offer nothing before the outcome of the Islands council election in November 1981, and the leaseback was never discussed, as a result, the Argentines rejected a freeze on talks, and by now the British were blatantly stalling. The Argentines, however, did not give up, and in September 1981 a sugar shortage on the

Islands was resolved when the Argentines flew in a mercy plane with 24 tons of food.

The British foreign office was in fact, in a hopeless position and has often been accused of being weak; however, for more than a decade of talking the Foreign Office had made no progress.

In September 1981, Mrs. Thatcher removed Mr. Ridley from the Foreign Office to the Treasury, and responsibility for the Falklands was transferred to Mr. Richard Luce who was less reckless political adventurer. And in November 1981, a new Islands council was elected and two representatives regarded as moderates including Mr. Stuart Wallace who had been at the New York talks lost their seats and two hardliners were voted in instead. By Feb. 1981, talks were due to be resumed in December 1981, but they

were postponed by the fall of general Viola as head of the Junta and his replacement by general Galtieri.

The Falklands talks were to be resumed in New York in February 1982; in fact, Riddley's last meeting with the Argentines had been frustrated by that vote for a freeze in the Falkland islands council; now there was a new council and so far there had been no proposals for them to vote on. On Feb. 25th, 1982 Mr. Luce packed his bags to fly to New York to talk to the Argentines, and John Cheek (one of the most hardline councilors) had joined him in New York; Luce was not bound by a council decision.

From Buenos Aires, Mr. Costa Mendez the new Foreign Secretary gave his negotiator Mr. Enrique Ros the most limited of briefs to take to New York; and at New York, Mr. Ros was insistent for some sign of progress on the Ridley initiative, and his basic

demands were for monthly meetings to work towards a settlement, a fixed agenda including sovereignty, and a deadline of the end of the year 1982.

On Feb. 26th, 1982, a compromise was agreed for a negotiating commission meeting regularly, an open agenda and at least an attempt to reach a settlement within a year. Both sides agreed to put this schedule to their respective government. Mr. Ros was adamant that he must have a reply within a month; Mr. Luce emphasised that the problem was the timing, and he said a deadline in 1982 would put intolerable pressure on the Islanders and on the House of communs. Luce also suggested that the first session should begin in May or June 1982 with a mandate to report back for a full review at the end a year. However, the two men agreed finally on a warm and optimistic communiqué to be published in three days time after each man had

reported back to his government. When the three days were up, Britain published the agreed communiqué but Argentina did not.

The junta claimed that the British had given them the run-around for 17 years and had got nowhere. Also if the deadline was met, it meant that by Jan. 1983, the 150th anniversary of Britain seizure of the Malvinas, the Argentine flag could fly there once again. But the British government did not want that to happen, and the prospects for Buenos Aires looked very different after the successive votes and elections to the Falklands council which not only proved the Islanders intransigence but they appeared to be well on the way to the creation of an independent state in the Malvinas. The Argentines finally decided that after 17 years of frustrated negotiations they had got nowhere.

Introduction to Argentina up to the war of 1982

The Argentine Republic (officially Republica Argentina) is second in area of the countries of South America and it has the shape of a wedge with the point towards the South and occupies the greater part of the southern extremity of the continent. The length of the Argentine territory from north to south is approximately 2,070 miles and its greatest width about 860 miles, and the Argentine area is about 1,078,278 square miles. The countries adjoining Argentina on the north and north-east are Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay.

Argentina is bounded on the west throughout its entire length by Chile; on the east and south-east, through approximately two-thirds of its length by the Atlantic Ocean; on the south by the coverging lines of

Chile and the Atlantic. Argentina also claims the Falkland Islands, the Falkland Islands dependencies and part of Antarctica.

The Race:

As in the United States, a new type has developed in Argentina as the result of a mixture of European race. There is less admixture of native Indian blood than in any other nation of South America with the possible exception of Uruguay. The native Indian races have almost died out, the total number of members of the indigenous races being given as 53,000 and nearly all of these live in the national territories of the north such as Formosa, Chaco, Misiones, and there are less than a thousand in La Pampa territory and a few hundreds in Patagonia, in Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego, moreover, in the thinly settled northern provinces of La Rioja Catamarca, Salta and Jujuy

Indian blood; added to this, the number of Negroes in the country is negligible. During the domination of Spain the bulk of immigration was Spanish so that the stock on which the country was built was mainly Spanish Creole. An indication of the relative importance of the various European strains in the Argentine race in 1940s, was the totals of immigration from the different countries since 1857 given under "immigration" which show that Italians composed about 47% of the total, Spaniards 33% and 63 other nations 20%; moreover, the 1914 census showed that in the three most populous provinces, Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Cordoba, Italians were most numerous among the foreign population and Spaniards next.

Migration:

Argentina has used every means to attract immigration. An immigration Law passed in 1876 includes provisions that immigrants shall be lodged and boarded for a limited time, and transported to their destination within the country at the expense of the government; they shall be assisted in finding work and allowed to import their goods duty free. In 1930s, there was a Jewish colonization enterprise owing large holding of land in Pampa provinces. In 1860, there were 4.747 immigrants and the number increased each year to 39,967 in 1870; thereafter years that established new records of entries were: 1873: 76,332 ;1885:108,722 ; 1889: 260,000 ; 1906: 302,000 ; 1908: 303,000 . From 1910 to 1914 the migratory movement was very heavy. During the period of 1857 to 1914 inclusive the total number of immigrants was 5,481,280 and of emigrants in the same period 2,562,790 leaving a net gain to the country of 2,918,490.

The Argentine population estimated at 23.4 million in 1970 and by 1980 it was about 27.2 million people. Increasingly the population of Argentina has become an urban one, and the proportion of those living in towns with more than two thousand inhabitants rose from 25% in 1914 to an estimated 75% in 1970, and over 80% in 1980 Added to the flow of immigrants from overseas, since mid-20th century, has been another flow from the countryside to the city, drawing with it many peasants from Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. As the country has become more urban, its growth in numbers has tended to become slower and births declined from an average of over 35 per 1,000 of the population in 1914-15 to about 22 per

1,000 in 1960. At the same period, Argentina's population grew at an average rate of 1.5% a year.

Language and Religion .

Spanish remains the national language, although it is spoken in may accents, also many foreign languages and dialects are to be heard in Argentina. Most of the people are nominally Roman Catholics; there are about 95% of the population claiming membership of this official religion of the country; added to this there are about 5,000,000 Protestants, 95,000 belonging to orthodox church, and about 90,000 Jews. The various faiths each have their own churches, cemeteries, hospitals, and socials centers.

Junta Militar.

The Junta Militar comprises the Chiefs of Staff of the army, navy and air force, and it shall be the supreme organ of State and its members shall remain in office

for maximum of three years. It may meet when one of its members requests it to do so but to meet in full session all members must be present, and decisions shall be made by simple majority. The Junta appoints and dismisses the president of the republic, and the appointment must take the form of an unanimous decision by the Junta and be finalized within 30 days, six months before the expiry of the outgoing president's mandate. The Junta also appoints members of the supreme court and the Tribunal de Cuentas, as well as the procurator-general and the Fiscal-General, from a list of names submitted by the president; the Junta must also approve appointments made by the president with regard to the cabinet, provincial governors, ambassadors and charges d'affaires. It is also responsible for appointments within the armed forces and for concluding peace treaties, border and neutrality agreements and concordats; it is able to summon through the Executive the members of the National and Provincial governments for information and advice.

President of the Republic :

The president must have been born on Argentina soil or be the son of an Argentine national, belong to the Catholic faith, be over 30 years of age, and be a retired high-ranking military officer. He would serve one three-year term of office with the possibility of one further term of office if re-elected by the Junta; and he may be dismissed by the unanimous decision of the Junta; and in the case of death, temporary absence or illness, executive power shall be assumed by the Minister of the Interior. The president shall have the following powers: to appoint and dismiss ministers, provincial governors, ambassadors and charges

d'affaires, subject to the approval of the Junta, to present a list of candidates to the Junta for appointment to the supreme court, and the Tribunal de Cuentas and to the posts of Procurator General and Fiscal-General, and confirm the choice of the Junta, to appoint members of the lower courts, to conclude and sign trade and economic agreements, and many other things. The president must make a report each year in March to the Junta on the results of his work during the year in government and on the general limes for the government's plans in the current year.

Military committee.

A military committee, comprising the president of the republic and the three chiefs of staff, is established to deal with all matters affecting national security; its work would be carried out by the existing joint chiefs

of staff and a temporary body known as the chiefs of staff of the armed forces which would carry out the functions hitherto exercised by the President in his capacity as Commander of the Armed Forces.

Argentine political parties.

Following the military takeover in March 1976, all political activities were banned, but in December 1979 the president announced that political parties would be allowed to function again in 1980, but until now (Oct. 1982) the political parties continue to be banned. However, the following are the political parties in Argentina:

- 1- Frente Justicialista de Liberacion (Frejuli:(
- 2- Partido Comunista Revolucionario.
- 3- Partido Federal.
- 4- Partido Intransigente .

- 5-Period Nacional de Centro.
- 6-Partido Obrero Comunista Marxista-Leninista .
- 7-Partido Politico Obrero
- 8-Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores .
- 9-Union de Centro Democratico.
- 10-Union Civica Radical .
- 11-Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores .
- 12-Consejo Supreme de Montoneros Peronistas.
- 13-Partido Autentico Peronista.

Chapter four

The Argentine invasion
Of the Falklands and
British declaration of war

The Argentine Occupation of the Islands

When the Argentine deputy Foreign Minister Mr.

Ros, proposed a commission which would be free to discuss all outstanding questions of sovereignty, trade, development and so on, and to meet monthly at Ministerial level to reach a conclusion by the end of 1982, Mr. Richard Luce (the British Minister at the foreign office) agreed in Principle and finally accepted it, but his problem was the timing (the deadline of 1982). The two men agreed on a warm and optimistic communique to be published in three days time after each man had reported back to his government. When the three days were up, Britain published the agreed communique but Argentina did not due to the deadline of December 1982 which Britain did not

accept. When Mr. Luce came back from Washington at the beginning of March 1982, he found some confusion in London.

What happened was then: a group of scrap metal merchants landed on South Georgia to clear some installation for a British company, but in doing so they raised Argentina's flag. As a result, Mr. Luce was extremely worried, and the British concern was registered in a series of protests and meeting between the ambassador Mr. Williams in Buenos Aires and Mr. Costa Mendes(the Argentine Foreign Minister). At these meetings, Mr. Costa Mendes assured the British he would send a ship to take the men off; in the meantime, there were reports from the British Joint intelligence committee which were not alarmist; they noted that the Argentines had rattled their sabres before without result; also they pointed out that

general Galtieri had enough troubles on his hands with a chaotic economy, rampant inflation and the threat of strikes and street demonstrations by the peronists.

The first signs that the British Cabinet Office and Downing street were taking the situation in Buenos Aires seriously appear to have been on March 25th 1982, when an Argentine vessel delivered further equipment to the group ashore. At the same time, the Argentine Foreign Office announced that the Argentine party in South Georgia would be given the full protection of the Argentine government. Also the Argentine newspapers had put their correspondents worldwide on the alert, and Diplomats had been told to cancel their leave.

On March 28th 1982, five Argentine vessels were reported to be in the area of South Georgia where the

group of Argentines had landed. In London the Ministry of Defence confirmed the presence of an Argentine patrol ship and two missile-carrying corvettes, but on March 29th, the Argentine fleet was reported to have put to sea for joint manoeuvres with the Uruguayan Navy which had frequently been held in the past, their movement at sea were also noted and reported by the British intelligence.

On March 30th, the Foreign Minister Mr. Luce told the commons in a statement that a diplomatic solution would be sought to the dispute with Argentina over the Falkland islands. He added: the situation is potentially dangerous, and if it comes to the point, it would be our duty to defend and support the islanders to the best of our ability. In the meantime, Lord Carrington who had hurriedly returned to Westminster from Brussels instead of flying straight

to Israel as planned was pressed on possible British military action, and he announced a review of the security situation in the Falkland islands, but his statement was attacked by the shadow foreign Secretary Mr. Denis Healy (Labour Party) in the commons who said that the government had been caught with its trousers down.

In fact, it was not until March 31st 1982 (two days before the invasion) that it became clear to the British intelligence sources that the Argentine contingent had broken off the manoeuvres and was steaming at full speed for the Falkland Islands.

When Mrs. Thatcher heard about the news, she called a crisis meeting in her room at the Commons; the Prime Minister consulted for five hours with Mr. Humphrey Atkins (Lord Carrington's deputy, because Lord Carrington had left for Tel Aviv the

previous day), and Mr. Richard Luce (the Foreign Office Minister who was dealing with the Falklands). It was too late to take military action to forestall it, instead moves were begun to gather diplomatic support and to notify the British allies that there would be a military riposte. The exercise to secure support for Britain in the security council was put in hand and preparations were made for the task force to sail as soon as possible. On March 31st, it was learned in Westminster that a hunter-killer submarine was already in the area and the destroyer Exeter has been ordered to leave the Caribbean waters for the Falklands.

On April 1st 1982, the Argentine marines landed on port Stanley (the capital of the Falkland islands); at the same time, the Argentine government announced that South Georgia and South Sandwich islands had

also been taken. The Argentine government added:
the lives, property, and general safety of Britons in the
Falkland islands would be guaranteed by the
Argentine government.

Two days later, the British Defence Secretary Mr.

Nott said that Britain was assembling up to 40

warships and 1,000 commandos. In the meantime,

Mrs. Thatcher made a statement at an emergency
session of parliament (the first Saturday sitting of the
commons since the Suez crisis of 1956), and it was
reported later that Britain has broken off diplomatic
relations with the Argentines and has urged the U.N.
Security Council to demand the immediate
withdrawal of the Argentines. Meanwhile the
Argentine's Ambassador to the U.N. was protesting to
the Security Council about 150 years of British
aggression against Argentina, and in Buenos Aires

President Galtieri of Argentina said in a broadcast that: Argentina had invaded the Falkland islands because of Britain's delaying tactics aimed at prolonging its colonial rule over the Atlantic archipelago. He added, "we have recovered the southern islands which by legitimate right are part of the national patrimony, with firmness but without rancour". Finally, Galtieri said, Britain's attitude of perpetuating its rule over the Falklands through an interminable succession of delays and evasions had left Argentina with no choice but to use force.

The British embassy in Buenos Aires told the 17,000 Britons in Argentina to act prudently and stay indoors, but there was no suggestion made that they should leave the country.

United Nations:

At the UN Council, the British Ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons demanded the following points: An immediate end to hostilities; the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops, ships and planes, and an appeal to the parties to seek a diplomatic solution of the long-running Falkland islands dispute. It was believed that, Britain could count on support from the U.S., France, Ireland, Japan, and Jordan (six sure votes); in the meantime, The Soviet Union (which has developed important trade relations with Argentina since the first American grain embargo) was hardly likely to do anything which might offend Buenos Aires, also Poland would follow Moscow's lead, but the three African States on the council (Zaire, Uganda and Togo) were being wooed by both sides as well as the two South American members

(Panama and Guyana). On April 3rd 1982, the UN backed Britain by demanding withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland islands; and the vote was 10 in favour (U.S., France, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Zaire, Uganda, Togo, Britain and Guyana), with four abstentions (Soviet Union, China, Poland and Spain) and only one in favour of Argentina (Panama).

On the international front:

The situation on the international level was as following: The French External Relations Minister Mr. Claude Cheysson had telephoned Lord Carrington to express France's solidarity with Britain against Argentina; The EEC also appealed to the government of Argentina to withdraw its forces immediately and to adhere to the appeal of the U.N. Secretary General to refrain from the use of force and

to continue the search for a diplomatic solution; but the EEC officials said the possibility of sanctions against Argentina by the European community was not explored by the common market political directors when they met to discuss the situation on April 1st 1982 (in fact, since Britain's entry into the EEC in 1973, trade between Argentina and the community had dropped substantially, although Argentina was an important supplier of agricultural produce for Britain a few years ago, but the trade patterns had changed, and there was no formal association agreement between the EEC and Argentina).

In Spain: the Spanish right wing and the Falangist party had used the invasion of the Falkland islands as Argentine's Gibraltar, and there were some leaflets scattered through Madrid calling for arms and a

military takeover of the disputed Rock of Gibraltar on the Argentine pattern.

Venezuela, which had a long-standing territorial dispute with a former British colony, expressed its solidarity with Argentina in the invasion of the Falkland islands, and the Venezuelan Foreign Minister Mr. Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco criticised the UN Security Council resolution which condemned the Argentine invasion and called for a withdrawal of troops. He said that the resolution made no mention of the occupation of the islands by the British nor of justified Argentine motives in ejecting a colonial power, and he referred indirectly to his country's dispute with neighbouring Guyana as a victim of colonial occupations.

British declaration of war Against Argentina

In London Mrs. Thatcher proclaimed in the British parliament that Britain's sense of outrage and the need for action in the fact of Argentina's Falkland islands coup, she said that the invasion has not a shred of justification nor a scrap of legality. Mrs. Thatcher also told MPs, It was not until 8.30 am.. On April 2nd that she was able to speak to the Falkland islands governor in Uruguay who had told her that the Argentine had landed at approximately 6 am. (Falkland islands time); and the governor sent a signal to us which we didn't receive. She added: the Falkland islands and their dependencies remain British territory, and there was no doubt the unequivocal wishes of the people on the Falkland

islands; they are British in stock and tradition and wish to remain so in allegiance; she also said: we have always said their wishes are paramount, and there will be no change in their sovereignty without their consent. She went on to say that; "Now a large task force would sail as soon as all the preparations were completed, and HMS invincible will be in the lead and will leave port on April 4th 1982.

So, in response to Mrs. Thatcher, president Galtieri said that the invasion troops are preparing for a British attack. He added, the Argentine government would not double back, and he claimed the Falklands as his country's newest province. In the meantime, the Argentine junta set up a military administration for the islands and named General Benjamin Menendez as military governor.

Twenty four hours later(April 4th,) the British Defence Secretary Mr. John Nott announced formally that: Britain is preparing for war with Argentina and that orders to fight would be given in the absence of a diplomatic solution. (in fact, Mr. Nott refused to rule out any option in the conflict with Argentina from a blockade of the Falklands up to action against the Argentine mainland).

The U.S., however, indicated that, it would in the last resort support the use of military force by Britain to recover the Falklands. At the same time, a white house official noted that Britain has the right to assert its self-defence rights under the U,N. charter after the invasion and the subsequent security council vote. But at the same time, the officials in Washington announced that a U.S. diplomatic efforts will headed

by Mr. Haig to prevent a major military engagement in the South Atlantic.

On the economical front:

Britain took her decisions to freeze Argentinian assets and to suspend her new trade with Argentina . In fact, the Argentine assets in London were estimated to be worth 1.4 billion dollars which consisted largely of currency deposits with banks; and on the exports credit side, the British government has guaranteed \$ 400 million for goods, these credits withdrawn in addition to the ban on new guarantees (at the end of 1980, the British exports to Argentina were worth \$173 million, and the British imports from Argentina cost about \$114 million); moreover, the British Trade Secretary Mr. John Biffen said in a statement in the house of common on April 5th 1982 that:in addition to the freezing of all Argentine financial assets in U.K.

and the decision not to provide new export credit cover for Argentina, other economic measures were being urgently examined and the government was consulting the European Community and other allies. He added: British citizens were advised not to travel to Argentina and British companies urged to withdraw their non-essential British staff, British firms must decide what action they should take in relation to the existing commitments in the light of the present circumstances, and they were advised not to enter into new commitments.

On the Argentine Front:

Argentina began to reinforce the 4,500 troops in the Falkland islands in preparation for a British attempt to recapture the territory; men and materials were being airlifted by Hercules C-130 aircraft out the bases in Rio Gallegos, Comodoro Rivadavia and

Usnusia; and from the Falkland islands. The new Argentine Governor General Menendez said that the country was consolidating its hold on the islands, and military action against an eventual English threat is tremendously important. There were tanks and armoured vehicles were rolling through the streets of port Stanley which has been renamed Puerto Antonia Rivero, but the islanders appeared to carry on life as usual.

Back to London:

It was reported on April 5th that Mrs. Thatcher had accepted the resignations of her Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, as well as the resignation of Mr. Humphrey Atkins and Mr. Richard Luce (Minister of State at the foreign office). These resignations, did not include the Defence Secretary Mr. John Nott thought only because Mrs. Thatcher flatly refused to accept it,

which astounded the conservative party at Westminster.

In fact, the resignation of Lord Carrington and his Foreign Office colleagues represented a wounding blow to Mrs. Thatcher's personal position as well as a painful one to the government's store of experience and competence. Indeed, many Tory backbenchers and the opposition believed that Mrs. Thatcher could hardly escape her share of responsibility for the disaster in the South Atlantic, and that was why all eyes fixed on the naval task force which her political career depended on for its success. Anyhow, Mrs. Thatcher's choice had been widely anticipated by Tory MPs on Mr. Pym who was regarded by MPs as the safe pair of hands in the Cabinet, and capable of coping with almost any crisis. Indeed, Mr. Pym came into the foreign office with clear hands and enormous

power (as we know, when one Foreign Secretary has resigned his successor must have enormous power, and no prime minister could survive the resignation of a second).

From Washington:

The organization of American States(OAS) met briefly to hear a formal account of the Falkland islands dispute from the Argentine Foreign Minister Mr. Costa Mendez. The session requested by the Argentines was described as a protocol meeting which lasted for about 30 minutes; in fact, the Argentines were hoping to mobilise regional opinion on their side (indeed, the OAS has always taken the view that it should be the authority to adjudicated in regional disputes and its 28 member countries have traditionally supported a nationalist line on colonial issues). The OAS had already declared itself

favourable to Buenos Aires, and its only resolution on the Falkland islands came from its inter-American Juridical committee in 1976 which stated that Argentina had an unassailable right to sovereignty over the territory and described the British claim as a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. But at the present crisis, the OAS committee said the presence of British warships in waters adjacent to member countries was a violation of international law. Twenty-four hours later, the American administration announced that they were not trying to act as mediators between the British and Argentines at this stage but were merely using their good offices to try and resolve a dispute between two of America's allies. At this point, President Reagan described America's role as that of honest broker. But the popular feeling in the U.S. was running heavily in support of Britain,

and the U.S. newspapers had been outspoken in favour of Britain and had been critical of American attempts to maintain a middle position between the two contestants.

In the meantime, it had become clear following the Argentine foreign minister's address to the OAS on April 5th that Latin American opinion was beginning to line up behind Argentina, and the two key prowestern Latin American countries (Venezuela and Brazil) had already voiced their support and most members of the OAS already recognized Argentine sovereignty over the islands.

Britain began to mobilise international opinion on their side once more, and on April 6th Britain called on Japan publicly to condemn Argentina's invasion of the Falkland islands, but the Japanese officials said that it would be difficult for Japan to join in economic

sanctions against Argentina because Japan was friendly with both countries, nevertheless the Japanese government gave its support to Britain's resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a withdrawal of Argentine troops.

As for the EEC, Britain put its case for a united EEC front of trade sanctions against Argentina at a meeting of permanent representative to the EEC in Brussels. Britain was hoping for trade sanctions covering steel, footwear, agricultural products and textiles to be introduced quickly; so, in preparation for such measures the European Commission was working on a draft proposal for sanctions based on article 224 of the treaty of Rome. This treaty, says that: Member States should consult and take steps together to prevent the EEC being affected by any measures brought in by an individual country in

certain defined circumstances; these include (serious international tension constituting a threat of war or in order to carry out obligations it had accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security). At any rate, the EEC commission issued a statement condemning the armed intervention of Argentina against a British territory linked to the community, as they put it (an intervention committed in violation of international law and the rights of the inhabitants of the Falkland islands. The statement went on: "the commission expressed its solidarity with the U.K. and it made an urgent appeal to the Argentine government to implement the resolution of the UN security council, calling on it to withdraw its troops from the islands and to continue seeking a diplomatic solution. But Britain's request for EEC wide ban on imports from Argentina failed to win the immediate support of its EEC partners(only France, Belgium, West Germany, and Netherlands confirmed a ban on arms shipments, but the rest asked for more time to study the problems in closing their doors to imports worth up to 1.5 million dollars a year).

Back to Washington: on April 7th 1982, the white house announced that, Mr. Alexander Haig (the U.S.

Secretary of States) is due to arrive in London on April 8th for talks with the Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Francis Pym(the new Foreign Secretary) on possible diplomatic solution to the crisis; and later Mr. Haig is due to go on for talks in Buenos Aires; moreover, the white house stressed that Mr. Haig's mission did not involve mediation but was merely the preliminary stage of a U.S. effort to resolve the crisis.

At the UN a diplomatic battle was waged over the Falkland islands; Argentina began to consider her

position on the international level, and four Latin American countries (Peru, Panama, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) spoke out in favour of Argentina, and they appealed to both sides in the conflict to begin negotiations. In the meantime, it was reported that a special meeting of the OAS was to be held in Washington on April 8th to consider the situation in the Malvinas islands that was endangering the peace of the continent. Also, the Argentine's UN Ambassador Mr. Eduardo Roca said on television that his country might consider a withdrawal of its troops as part of an overall settlement of the dispute.

But in London the story was different; the British government went to the brink of a declaration of war against Argentina by announcing a naval blockade of the Falkland islands, and the British Defence Secretary Mr. John Nott announced that: from April

within 200 miles of the islands will be treated as hostile and will be liable to attack by British forces. He added that Britain's first naval action would be intended to deny the Argentine forces on the Falklands means of reinforcement and resupply from the mainland; consequently, all shipping is being informed that from 0400 Greenwich mean time on April 12th a maritime exclusion Zone will be established around the Falkland islands, and the outer limit of this zone is a circle of 200 nautical miles radius latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes south, 59 degrees 30 minutes west, which is the center of the Falkland islands.

From the Falkland islands: it was reported that

Argentina installed its own administration on the

Falkland islands. The installation of Gen. Mario

Menendez marked the end of the first phase of Argentina's military occupation of the Falklands which began on April 2nd; general Menendez, the new governor of the islands aged 52 was sworn in at a ceremony broadcast live for two hours on national radio, and a number of leading public figures joined the ceremony, they included bishops, trade union leaders, and the head of the main political parties including the peronists and the Radicals (the two major opposition groups) all of whom had volunteered to fly to the islands. This ceremony was the most clear indication of the wide domestic political support which the Argentine military regime enjoyed over its Falklands policy. General Menendez came from an army family, and immediately before going to the Falklands, he vas chief of staff at army headquarters in Buenos Aires; when he took over his new post he said: "I will govern the islands with a small personal English speaking Cabinet", and he planned a gradual process of integrating the 1800 islanders into the Argentine way of life, and those who do not wish to embrace Argentine nationality could remain British subjects, and the islanders are free either to stay or to leave, and any of them who choose to leave wold be compensated.

On the other hand, the British and Anglo-Argentine community in Buenos Aires (more than 110,000 people of British descent) sent a telegram to Mrs. Thatcher telling her: We do not feel that our situation has been fully considered or taken into account"; the telegram also said: Argentina had always shown every consideration to the British community, and it strongly urged Mrs. Thatcher to seek a peaceful

solution in the light of the size of the community and the strong British presence in Argentina.

On the international level:

The permanent representatives of the EEC countries met again to discuss the British request for a total import ban on Argentine goods, and export credit squeeze, an arms ban and a halt to private bank loans to Argentina; but the different member governments after assessing the overall effects of the sanctions against Argentina decided to meet again.

The French government decided to apply an embargo on all deliveries of arms, ammunition, and spare parts to Argentina; embargo also applied in particular to the current contracts—for aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. The French embargo covered a contract signed in 1979 for 14 Super-Etendards fighters ordered for the Argentine Navy totaling \$90 million

(only six had so far been delivered); the aircraft made by the Dassault-Breguet company and specifically designed for use on aircraft carriers. The aircraft was equipped and fitted with Magic air-to-air missiles and the Exocet air-to-ship missile which has a range of 400 miles, and is regarded by experts as distinctly superior in performance to the Douglas Skyhawk attack bomber. The French government also put a stop to plans for an armoured vehicle deal which became the subject of revived controversy in French newspapers on April 2nd 1982.

But from the Soviet Union, it was reported that the Soviet foreign Minister said that Britain had sabotaged a long-standing UN general Assembly Resolution calling on colonial powers to surrender sovereignty in certain overseas territories of which the Falklands were one . He added :"over many years

Britain as a governing power has stubbornly opposed UN demands over the decolonisation of this territory and dragged out negotiations with Argentina; in the meantime, the Soviet army newspaper said: the conflict had grown alarmingly, but the solution lay in observance of UN resolutions ending the colonial status of the Falklands.

However, on April 9th, Argentina complained to the UN Security Council that Britain's declaration of a war zone was an act of aggression, therefore, Argentina felt entitled to use its right of self Defence. In the meantime, Senior government officials in Buenos Aires told Argentine journalists that, Argentina was prepared to withdraw its troops from the Falkland islands as part of moves towards negotiations with Britain(given certain conditions), the officials, however, did not say what these

Argentina was seeking a declaration from Britain that it would cede sovereignty but at the same time, Argentina would not accept a Hongkong or Andorra type of arrangement as this would not give the Argentines full sovereignty.

At the same time, Mr. Haig (the U.S. Secretary of State) was in Buenos Aires to attempt a diplomatic break-through in the Falklands dispute after he left London, but at the sametime, a communication system has been established so that the British can talk to him in Argentina. In fact, there was a suspicion in the British government that the Americans would end up by letting down the British, just as happened at the Suez crisis in 1956 when the Americans refused to support the pound without British withdrawal.

Therefore, the British government was determining on the following points:

- 1- The Falkland islands must first be recovered before there can be negotiations on their future status.
- -YArgentine warships and naval auxiliaries found in the 200 maritime exclusion zone around the Falkland are liable to attack after 4 am. Greenwich mean time April 12th 1982.

Indeed, the British government saw the loss of the Falklands as a national humiliation and its principal aim was to restore credibility by getting the islands back, and negotiations could come afterwards it his was dressed up by a laudable determination to stand up to dictators everywhere, though it was notable that the British mass media did not start referring to General Galtieri as a dictator until after the invasion took place. In fact, the British government was quite

willing to woo the Argentine regime for commercial contracts so long as it kept out of the Falklands. Anyhow, the BBC world service had begun broadcasting a Foreign Office message advising British citizens to leave Argentina. The message was broadcasting three times a day telling them that: if they have no pressing reason for staying they should consider leaving by normal commercial means. The BBC advise was linked with the decision to impose a blockade around the Falklands from 4 am GMT on April 12th 1982.

Britain was intensifying its efforts to isolate the Argentine regime politically and diplomatically, therefore, Mr. Julian Bullard (the Deputy Head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) went to Brussels for an extraordinary meeting of the European Community's committee for political co-operation

where he sought tougher action by the ten countries against Buenos Aires. In fact, Britain secured an EEC wide arms ban against Argentina, but despite further expressions of political solidarity by its partners, it appeared to find agreement on a community embargo against Argentine trade more elusive. At any rate, the member States were known to have reinforced their arms ban agreement with a fresh expression of solidarity with Britain and condemnation of the Argentine invasion of April 2nd 1982, and they also urged that Argentina should respond to the UN Security Council's Resolution calling for the withdrawal of its troops in the Falklands and a negotiated settlement. The political support for British position was clouded by the problems that surround a full-scale trade embargo against Argentina, and it was clear that four member States were believed to

harbour reservations on various aspects of the imports ban requested by Britain. Denmark, for example, insisted that it cannot accept the use of the supra-national measures contained in Article 113 of the Rome Treaty (which means more flexible measures) .Also, Ireland and Italy were reportedly cool on the total cutting-off of Argentine trade, partly because of their requirements of raw hides and because of Italy's major emigrant population in Argentina; Ireland also had ambivalent views on the UK's position regarding the Falkland islands. On April 10th, it was reported from London that the conservative leadership sought to really support behind Mrs. Thatcher and her threat to use force to recover the islands; so, an appeal for national unity was made by Mr. Cecil Parkinson (the chairman of firm together reflected concern in the government that public support for the dispatch of the naval task force could be threatened by action leading to casualties or sinking. In spite of public protestations of loyalty, a number of Conservatives had already begun to voice in private their doubts over Mrs. Thatcher's long term future, they feared that unless she could achieve a speedy and conclusive victory over the Argentines the demands for her resignation might increase.

Mr. Haig (the U.S. Secretary of state) began a series of meeting with general Galtieri and other members of the military junta in Buenos Aires to keep Britain and Argentina from going to war. After Haig's first meeting which lasted two hours, he left Argentina, but President Galtieri announced that Argentina was ready to teach a lesson to anyone who dares to touch a

single square metre of Argentine territory, he added, I ask the British government and the British people to moderate their pressures and to moderate their acts, but if Mrs. Thatcher continued towards confrontation, Argentina will have no choice and will be ready to go on the offensive.

In the meantime, some concern had been expressed by senior white House officials, and three main reasons had contributed to the optimism. First: the Argentine junta appeared to have pulled back from its initial stipulation that it would not enter negotiations unless and until Britain conceded Argentine sovereignty over the islands; second: the junta was putting surprisingly strong emphasis on the oil rights in and around the Falklands but not much more; Third: the junta was seen by white House officials as getting increasingly concerned that what started as an action to strengthen

its waning political fortunes could boomerang and force the fall of general Galtieri. In fact, both London and Buenos Aires were holding the hardest of hard lines, however, two of the suggested formula, the so-called "Hong Kong, and Andorran" solutions rejected by Buenos Aires and the islanders, and a third one known as the three flags. The three compromises work were to work were as follows:

1- Hong Kong: Britain will cede sovereignty to
Argentina, then leases the islands back for a long
or short period (the dickering would be between
five and 99 years) and undertakes the
administrations during that period so that the
inhabitants can decide whether to stay under
eventual Argentine ownership or to leave and start
again elsewhere.

- 2- Andorra: Modelled on a treaty of 1278 A.D which placed that tiny Pyrenean country under the joint suzerainty of two French and Spanish princes, later on, it was represented by President Mitterrand of France and the Bishop of Urgel (it was much favoured by the Falklands lobby in London, but never seriously discussed at government or islands level).
- 3- Three Flags: An expanding version of Andorra, designed to avoid straight sovereignty sharing between Britain and Argentina, and the U.S would come in as friend of all parties, and the three governments would jointly guarantee some form of island autonomy.

The three ideas were put forward as face-saving way to defuse the crisis, but so far they had attracted no public support in either Britain or Argentina. On the international level, the EEC agreed to impose a ban on all imports from Argentina, and this decision came after six separate meetings of ambassadors in Brussels over the past five days which saw violent swings of opinion and strong pressures from almost every country for a more half hearted reaction. The final result was largely attributed to the influence of the Foreign Ministers who in every country threw their weight behind community solidarity.

On April 11th, The British Foreign Secretary Mr. Pym said on the BBC radio that he did not expect any Argentine naval vessels to present themselves as targets in the Falkland islands emergency zone from 4 am GMT on April 12th 1982. He added: if there is to be some arrangement whereby can achieve diplomatic means to end this dispute, then "he said" I would not expect there to be any targets in this zone. Mr. Pym

made it clear that if any hostile ships remained then they would be attacked; that is the position, he said. The U.S. Secretary of State Mr. Haig left Buenos Aires for London with what his spokesman termed specific ideas for discussion to remove the threat of war between Britain and Argentina. Mr. Haig's intercontinental shuttle made it clear that the U.S Administration was giving top priority to the resolution of the Falkland islands crisis. The reasons for this were that the U.S. has interests in this crisis which differed from Britain, and that it believed it had a distinctive role to ply partly because of its power and influence and partly because of those special interests. Indeed, the American administration was afraid of the dispute over the islands further undermining stability in Central America, and it had looked upon Argentina as a potential partner in Latin America and would

like still to be able to do so; and in particular it wanted to avoid the Rio Treaty being invoked against the introduction of forces outside the continent into the American hemisphere. Anyhow, from Barbados, president Reagan announced that Britain and Argentina were confronting each other in a complex disagreement which goes back many generations; he added, because they are both our friends, I've "he said" offered our help in an effort to bring the two countries together. In fact, President Reagan used the visit to Jamaica and Barbados to launch strong attacks against the pro-Communist regimes in Cuba and Grenada (commenting on remarks by Mr. Reagan that Grenada was spreading the virus of Marxism in the region, Mr. Maurice Bishop "Grenada's prime minister" said Mr. Reagan's presence in the Caribbean was an insult and that his

type of democracy was one that cut social assistance, closed schools and aided Fascist countries like El-Salvador, Haiti and Chile).

On the international level: The Soviet newspaper Pravda said that, Mr. Haig was acting as a messenger for British neocolonialists while posing as a mediator, and the British use of force to regain control of the Falklands contradicted UN resolutions on the decolonization of the islands. Pravda added, the British Tories cannot quite rid themselves of nostalgia for the glorious colonial times when Great Britain used to bear the awesome name Ruler of the Seas and when gunboat diplomacy was commonplace, and Britain's strong stand must have a more selfish motive than the defence of the rights of the islanders, and there was a disproportion between Britain's bellicose actions and the scale of the dispute; the newspaper

added: the present conflict by London reveals the desire to cover up the failures of the Conservative government in domestic policies. The Soviet newspaper went on to ask: is there any reason for following line of unleashing a war? Have the British Tories failed to learn from the ignominious failure of the Suez venture undertaken by them in 1956?; the Argentines wish to exploit the underwater oil and gas reserves around the Falklands lay behind Britain's actions, and presented the case as an example of old-fashioned colonial economic exploitation.

In fact, Argentina had special claim on Soviet sympathies(regardless of the nature of the regime);

sympathies(regardless of the nature of the regime); the country belongs to the Third world and the Soviet theology dictates that Third World claims should always be supported against colonial imperialists.

But from China, it was reported that the British residents of the largest remaining colony (Hongkong) were watching the Falklands crisis warily, worried about the implications for them, and the outlook as they saw it was that when China decides she wants Hongkong back, there will be no fleet sent to the rescue and the Chinese army will march over the border while Britain's official representatives withdraw. China in fact, ceded Hongkong island to Britain in 1841, the kowloon peninsula and stonecutters island were added in 1860, and further mainland area and many islands were leased to Britain by China in 1898 for 99 years. So, what the British and Pro-British colony wanted from the Falklands crisis was a firm indication that British sovereignty will not lightly be renounced anywhere.

In Latin America, the Cuban Ambassador Senor Navarro said that, Cuba fully supported Argentina's right to the Falklands. And from Brazil, it was reported that the bulk of the Brazilian Navy left Rio de Janeiro and headed south, the departure of the Brazilian fleet for the extreme south of Brazil's territorial water was explained by the naval command in Rio as normal manoeuvres; in fact, Brazil and Argentina were maintaining normal relations and have a great deal in common ideologically; moreover, Brazil and Argentina are members of SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organization), Also the tow countries have strong commercial links and engaged in a number of joint ventures.

As for South Africa which has been cultivating good relations with South American countries recently, maintains diplomatic relations with Argentina

(without a charge d' affairs) ;Senor Alfredo Oliva of Argentina put his country's view of the dispute at a South African press in Cape Town.In fact, the South Atlantic Treaty organization involving South Africa and Argentina and has been in existence for nearly a decade (about 1972 - 3); the treaty was designed to fill what is felt to be a power vacuum created by the cancellation of the Simons-town agreement between Britain and South Africa and the American ban on U.S. warships using South African ports. The treaty is believed to be designed as a South Atlantic equivalent of the NATO pact. Anyhow, the South Atlantic Treaty organization (SATO) contain provisions for mutual assistance in the case of aggression by an outside source against any of its members whom are: South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Taiwan as well as Israel.

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